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CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICIALS FOR ILLICIT ENRICHMENT:
COMPARING APPROACHES OF THE USE
OF INDIRECT METHODS OF PROOF IN
INVESTIGATING ILLICIT ENRICHMENT IN
INDONESIA AND THE U.S.1
Laras Susanti *
Abstract
In recent years, the international community has come to recognize the power of investigating illicit
enrichment for uncovering corrupt offenses. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
(IACAC) and the United Nation Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) are two international
conventions that address the issue of illicit enrichment. Indonesia, as a signatory of the UNCAC,
does not criminalize illicit enrichment as the UNCAC recommends, but it does require public officials
to submit financial disclosures, which may be used by the Indonesian Corruption Eradication
Commission (KPK) to strengthen the evidence in corruption prosecutions. This system has not worked,
however, because there is no criminal or civil prosecution for failing to file financial disclosures, or for
giving false statements within those disclosures; further, there is no specific methods of proof to use in
investigations. As a result, there has been significant debate over whether Indonesia should criminalize
illicit enrichment, consistent with the recommendation of the UNCAC. Part of the debate centers on
concerns about the rights of defendants and the threat of individual rights regarding presumption of
innocence. Drawing from the U.S. approach to investigations in tax evasion and financial disclosure
cases, this paper recommends that Indonesia avoid criminalizing illicit enrichment, and instead
establish civil and criminal prosecution of financial disclosure system for fail to file and give false
information, and incorporate indirect methods of proof for illicit enrichment investigation that may
find evidence to strengthen corruption prosecutions.

Keywords: Illicit Enrichment, corruption eradication, prosecution,

I. INTRODUCTION
Corruption, as a type of white collar crime, has been evolving into a
sophisticated enterprise, making direct evidence hard to find by any legal apparatus. The international community has responded to this situaResearcher at Center for Anti-Corruption Studies (PUKAT Korupsi), Faculty of
Law, University of Gadjah Mada, Indonesia; Global Coordinating Body (GCB) Representative for East Asia and Pacific of the Global Youth Anti-Corruption (GYAC)
Network; education background: University of Washington, School of Law, Asian
and Comparative Law LL.M Program (2014) and University of Gadjahmada,
Faculty of Law, Undergraduate (2007).
*
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tion by proposing that governments look to illicit enrichment of public
officials as a “yellow flag” that a corrupt offense has happened. For
instance, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (IACAC)
requires signatory parties to criminalize illicit enrichment;2
Meanwhile, the United Nations Convention against Corruption
(UNCAC) provides a non-mandatory provision for signatory states to
consider criminalizing illicit enrichment of public officials.3There have
been varied responses from signatory parties. While a number of countries have enacted domestic laws to criminalize illicit enrichment, others
have established alternative systems to address this issue. This article
examines the latter. Consistent with these alternative approaches, Indonesia does not criminalize illicit enrichment of public officials. It has
established a financial disclosure system under the corruption eradication regime, where public officials have to file financial disclosure statements to the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).4
This commission has authority to register and investigate disclosure
statements;5 findings from this investigation may be used to strengthen
the prosecution of corruption. In fact, this system has not successfully
performed for several reasons. The first reason is Indonesian laws do
not provide criminal and civil prosecution for failing to file and to give
false statements.6 Further, there are no specific methods of proof that
may be used by the KPK to investigate illicit enrichment evident in the
This article grew out of my master’s research under the supervision of Professor
Scott Schumacher at University of Washington Law School (Spring 2014). Additionally, I worked with Professor Elizabeth Baldwin over the Summer in polishing this
article. I would like to thank both of them for their best efforts supervising me.
1

Organization of American States, Inter American Convention Against Corruption
[IACAC] art. IX, Marc 29, 1996, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996), available at http://
www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html.
3
United Nations Convention Against Corruption [UNCAC], Dec. 14, 2005, 2349
U.N.T.S 41, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.
4
See Undang-Undang tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi [Combating
Corruption Act], Act. No. 31, 1999 jo. Act. No 20, 2001, art. 37; Undang-Undang Undang-Undang tentang Penyelenggara Negara yang Bersih dan Bebas Korupsi [CleanState Act], Act. No. 28, 1999, art. 71.
5
Ibid
6
Ibid
2
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statements.7Consequently, many public officials have failed to file their
financial disclosure statements, and for those who do register financial
disclosure statements that reflect possible illicit enrichment, the KPK
has not followed with investigations.8 Further, the KPK has to rely on
direct evidence to investigate and prosecute corruption—evidence that
is difficult to come by.
Like Indonesia, the U.S. does not criminalize illicit enrichment of
public officials, but it has been using an alternative method—establishing criminal and civil prosecution for financial disclosure statements and
using tax evasion prosecution in conjunction with other charges like corruption.9 Specifically, in investigating illicit enrichment under tax evasion
prosecution, the U.S. investigators examine tax-payers’ claims by comparing actual wealth with tax reports, using indirect methods of proof,
such as net worth,10 bank deposit,11 expenditure,12 and cash13methods, In
light of the U.S. approach, this paper claims that the Indonesian government should consider to establishing criminal and civil prosecution for
financial disclosure and implement indirect methods of proof, such as
the net worth, bank deposit, expenditure, and cash methods.
First, this paper describes the problem of corruption in Indonesia,
Ibid
See KPK, Wajib Lapor LHKPN [Public Officials Who Are Obligated to File Financial Disclosure Statements], ACCH http://acch.kpk.go.id/wajib-lapor-lhkpn (last
visited May 22, 2014).
9
Department of International Law the Organization of American States, Signatories
and Ratifications B 58: Inter- American Convention Against Corruption,[hereinafter
Reservation to IACAC] http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-58.html (last visited May 22, 2014)
10
See Internal Revenue Manual 9.5.9, .9.5.9.5 The Net Worth Method of Proof (hereinafter Internal Revenue Manual 1), updated March 19, 2012 available at http://www.
irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-009.html.
11
See Internal Ravenue Manual 9.5.9 Methods of Proof, 9.5.9.7 Bank Deposits Method of Proving Income (hereinafter Internal Revenue Manual 2), Updated November 5,
2004, available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-009-cont01.html.
12
See Internal Revenue Manual 9.5.9 Methods of Proof, 9.5.9.6. Expenditures Method
of Proving Income (Internal Revenue Manual 3), updated November 5, 2004, available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005- 009.html#d0e1812.
13
See Internal Revenue Manual 9.5.9 Methods of Proof, 9.5.9.8 Cash Method of Proving Income (Internal Revenue Manual 4), updated November 5, 2004, available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-009-cont01.html.
7
8
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the Indonesian laws governing corruption along with Indonesian legal
apparatus approach in investigating illicit enrichment. Next, it elaborates on the problem of corruption in the U.S. along with the explanation of U.S. laws governing corruption and investigating illicit enrichment. This paper then analyzes what Indonesia can learn from the U.S.
approach, recommends how to establish an illicit enrichment investigation reform in Indonesia, and gives solutions to overcome some possible obstacles to reform.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ILLICIT
ENRICHMENT
A. Obligation to Criminalize Illicit Enrichment
In general, the international framework, including the Inter-American Convention on Corruption and the United Nations Convention
against Corruption, require or recommend criminalization of illicit enrichment. These conventions define illicit enrichment as an increasing
of wealth that cannot be traced to legal income.14 These increases in
wealth are sometimes particularly challenging to investigate because
they result from corruption, which may involve public actors who transfer money overseas and outside the jurisdiction of their countries of
origin. This corrupt activity is well illustrated by recent data showed
in a meeting of the Second Committee of the General Assembly of the
United Nations where a Nigerian representative stated that about $400
billion was transferred overseas from African countries. 15Similarly,
from the mid-1990s to 2008, a leak from the People’s Bank of China
revealed that corrupt officials sent $120 billion from China.16 Within
the Americas, The TI reported more than $2 million of Plan Columbia funds were stolen and reported taken by more than twenty corrupt
Colombian Officers.17 Notably, investigating the overseas accounts of
public officials on those cases has never been easy because of the lack
See Organization of American States, supra note 1; United Nations, supra note 2.
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Presumed Guilty: Balancing Competing Rights and Interest in
Combating Economic Crimes, 40 INT’L LAW. 909, 935 (2006).
16
Margaret K. Lewis, Presuming Innocence, or Corruption in China, 50 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 287, 290 (2012).
17
Luz Estella Nagle, The Challenges of Fighting Global Organized Crime in Latin
America, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1649, 1686 (2003).
14
15
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of transparency in many worlds’ financial systems.18
Even though illicit, enrichment has been recognized as a serious
problem, before the 1960s there was no significant law enforcement
system to respond to it. Indeed, gaining suspicious wealth at that time
was not a criminal offense, and without direct evidence of involvement
in a corrupt scheme, a prosecution of a public official would be unlikely.
Eventually, in 1960s, a Congressman in Argentina named Rodolfo Corominas Segura proposed a bill to prosecute public officials who could
not reasonably explain their increasing wealth.19 Although, the exact
proposed bill has never been approved, the idea inspired several bill
proposals with the same concern in 1964.20
Meanwhile, India established the Prevention of Corruption Act in
1988 that defines unknown sources of income as “income received
from any lawful source, and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being
applicable to a public servant.” In addition, unlike Segura’s proposal,
India’s new law included the illicit enrichment of public officials as an
offense of criminal misconduct in which imprisonment not less than
one year or may be extend to seven years shall be imposed to a public
official who commit this crime.21
Afterwards, several regional and international anti-corruption conventions were established and setup specific requirements to respond
illicit enrichment of public officials. The Inter-American Convention
against Corruption (IACAC) is recognized as the first convention that
defines and requires signatory parties to criminalize the illicit enrichment of public officials.22 Since first introduced in 1996, this convention
has been ratified by 34 countries.23 The purpose of this Convention is
Kofele-Kale, supra note 14, at 937
LINDY MUZILA ET ALL, ON THE TAKE: CRIMINALIZING ILLICIT ENRICHMENT TO FIGHT CORRUPTION 8 (2012).
20
Id
21
The India Prevention of Corruption Act No. 48 of 1988, Chapter III: Offences
and Penalties, Point 13, September 9, 1988, available at http://www.persmin.gov.in/
DOPT/EmployeesCorner/Acts_Rules/PCAct/pcact.pdf (last visited May 5, 2014).
22
Background, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, SECRETARIAT OF
LEGAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL COOPERATION, http://www.oas.
org/juridico/english/corr_bg.htm (last visited May 22, 2014).
23
Ibid
18
19
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to prevent and prosecute transnational bribery and illicit enrichment of
public officials.24
Specifically, Article IX defines illicit enrichment as “a significant
increase in the assets of a public official in which he cannot reasonably explain in relation to his lawful earnings during the performance
of his function.”25 Moreover, this Article requires a state party to establish laws that acknowledge illicit enrichment as a corrupt offense.26 This
convention includes the illicit enrichment requirement in its mandatory
provisions for the signatory states, yet there is no further explanation
how to develop any methods of proof and possible punishment for this
type of offense.27 Eight years after the establishment of the IACAC, the
UN introduced of the United Nations Convention against Corruption
(UNCAC) as a universal tool to combat corruption. Like the IACAC,
this international legal framework provides comprehensive standards,
measures, and rules to combat corruption.28 The idea to criminalize the
illicit enrichment of public officials was also introduced. The UNCAC
defines illicit enrichment, in Article 20, as “a significant increase in the
assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income.”29 Unlike the IACAC which provides
mandatory requirements to signatory states to criminalize the illicit enrichment of public officials, the UNCAC recommends the criminalization of public officials’ illicit enrichment in non mandatory provisions
which only require signatory states to consider regulating illicit enrichment as a corrupt offense.30
In addition, the United Nation on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published legislative guide for the implementation of UNCAC. Particularly, this guidance paper mentions to implement Article 20, first, state
parties have to incorporate article with Articles 26-30 and 42. In brief,
those articles require the signatory parties to establish laws that include
the liability of main actor or principal, accomplice, assistant, or investiIbid
IACAC supra note 1, art. IX.
26
Ibid
27
Ibid
28
Foreword of UNCAC, supra note 2
29
Ibid, Art 20
30
Ibid
24
25
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gator of an offense in criminal, civil, or administration jurisdiction that
make them may be punished by criminal and monetary sanction; the element of an offence consists of knowledge, intent, and purpose; a long
statute of limitation period of allegation may be evaded by administration of justice; the Commission of offense, immunities or jurisdictional
privileges, judicial exercise of any discretionary legal powers related
to corruption prosecution, gravity of the offences in relation with early
release or parole, administrative procedures (suspension, reassign, removal) for a public official who is charged with an offense may respect
the principle of the presumption of innocence and re-engagement of
convicted person to society.31
Next, signatory states must establish investigation of illicit enrichment, creating a method of proof. Specifically, as this article mentioned
earlier, illicit enrichment may be recognized as criminal offence under the Convention, but it is not a prima facie proof of corruption.32
Therefore, methods of proof are needed in the investigation. Specifically, many signatory states have applied manifestation of presumption of innocence by giving the defendant the right to give a reasonable
explanation of the increase of his or her wealth, but still the burden
of proof remains on the prosecutor.33 Regardless, the guidance explains
what steps need to be established, and how some signatory states have
criminalized illicit enrichment. Nevertheless, it offers no further explanation about what tools can be used in investigating illicit enrichment
or to what extent prosecutors must prove the enrichment relates to corruption.34
B. Challenges to Criminalize Illicit Enrichment
While the IACAC and the UNCAC recognize illicit enrichment by
public officials as a universal critical issue, there are several further
questions that are not covered by those conventions. Six years after the
UNCAC was established, the UNODC and the World Bank released a
United Nations on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the UNCAC 103 (2006), available at https://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/CoC_LegislativeGuide.pdf.
32
Ibid
33
Ibid
34
Ibid
31
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research report that gives further guidance on illicit enrichment of public officials under the UNCAC.35 This report explains to monitor public
officials wealth, the government has to spend more energy to establish
financial disclosure statement system.36 That challenging task, however,
may be supported by countries experience in prosecuting money laundering. While, in money laundering, the report explains there is no need
to prove the underlying crimes, this proof is needed to prosecute illicit enrichment, but the government is not obligated to find the origin
of money.”37 Using those approaches, the prosecution must prove that
the enrichment in question did not come from legal income sources
that establish “the presumption that the enrichment is the proceeds of
corruption.”38 In turn, the defendant may defend against this presumption by presenting evidence that the enrichment came from illegal income sources; if the defendant fails to do so, then the presumption leads
to a conviction, and the defendant is liable for penalties.39
In addition, the UNODC and the World Bank interpretations of the
implementation of due process rights are more flexible, especially when
it comes to public interest. Indeed, the report mentions several signatory
parties’ experiences in incorporating the need to protect due process
rights with the public interest to combat corruption.40 Since the 1960’s,
several countries have enacted laws to criminalize this offense such as
Argentina, Hong Kong, Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Ecuador, the
Arab Republic of Egypt, the Dominican Republic, Pakistan, and Senegal have enacted laws governing the prosecution for the illicit enrichment of public officials.41
Again, there is no doubt, all of signatory states of the IACAC and
the UNCAC support and show their commitments to combat corruption,
but there has been a considerable debate within the State Parties related
to the risk of violating civil rights by criminalizing illicit enrichment of
LINDY MUZILA, supra note 16 at 8
Ibid, p 7-8
37
Ibid
38
Ibid
39
Ibid
40
Ibid, p. 32
41
Ibid, p. 8
35
36
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public officials. The U.S., as a pioneer in combating corruption,42 has
decided not to be bound by the mandatory requirement of the IACAC
and non-mandatory provision of the UNCAC about illicit enrichment.
Specifically, in the U.S.’s reservations to the IACAC, it is stated
that the U.S. has already regulated the obligation of senior-level public
officials in federal institutions to submit financial disclosure statements
as subject to criminal penalties, as well as the prosecution of public officials who evade taxes of their increasing income.43 Moreover, the U.S.
reservations maintain that putting the burden of proof on defendants,
who cannot reasonably prove that their enrichment came from lawful
sources, violates due process under the U.S. Constitution and fundamental principles of the U.S. legal system.44 As to the UNCAC, the U.S.
reserves under special circumstances, that the state and federal laws
will not be enough to satisfy the obligations under Chapters II and III
of the Convention—in which the illicit enrichment provision is stated.45
Indonesia is also a signatory state party for the UNCAC, but it
only reserves Article 66 in which it is not bound by Article 66 paragraph 2.46 Indonesia argues that parties to disputes over interpretation
or application of the Convention must consent to the jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice.47 Even though Indonesia is still open
to implementing Article 20, until now like the U.S., Indonesia does
not criminalize illicit enrichment. There has been a heated discussion
The US is the first country that criminalized foreign bribery by the establishment the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTEMENT OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/ (last visited May 5, 2014).
43
Department of International Law the Organization of American States, supra note 8.
44
Ibid
45
The US reservation also mentions this Convention will not influence in any respect
the US cooperation with other State Parties. This country is not bound by Article 66
paragraph 2 with the same reason as this country mentions for the UNTOC’s reservation. The US reservation to UNCAC is the same with its reservation to UNTAC, in
sense that the UNCAC shall be applied under the federalism legal framework. Specifically, for corrupt offenses under this Convention, but within states jurisdiction then the
state laws are applied. Moreover, state does regulate the laws that are compliance with
the obligations on preventive measures in the Convention; however they may work in
a different manner. UNCAC, supra note 2.
46
Ibid
47
Ibid
42
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whether or not Indonesia criminalizes illicit enrichment. On the one
hand, Indonesia needs to make an extraordinary effort to combat corruption by criminalizing illicit enrichment, suggesting approach like
those already been taken in countries like Argentina and the U.K.; on
the other hand, Indonesia has remained committed to protect defendant’s right of presumption of innocence.
The U.S. reservations to both conventions have undermined several
fundamental theories of human rights and criminal prosecution. First,
criminalizing public officials who cannot reasonably prove their illicit
enrichment came from legal sources would likely violate the due process rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment of U.S. Constitution in
which an accused person be presumed innocent until proven guilty.48 The
presumption of innocence is shown by putting the burden of proof to
prosecutors who present “material element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”49 Although a defendant can defense, this application of
burden of proof “cannot constitutionally be shifted to the defendant.”50
Again, illicit of enrichment does not constitute a prima facie case
of corruption, and it is difficult to say whether a government may prosecute a public official just because he or she gained and later could not
explain it; thus, the U.S. prefers prosecute tax evasion as a way to investigate illicit enrichment. In tax evasion, showing that taxpayers who
are being enriched are punished because they are avoiding taxation—
not because they have been personally enriched. They violate the law
by trying to hide their enriched wealth from the tax system along with
public officials who failed or gave false information in their financial
Lucinda A. Low et. al., The Inter-American Convention against Corruption: A
Comparison with the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J. INT’L L.
243, 281-82 (1998). See fifth amendment of the US constitution, as written:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
49
Lucinda A. Low et. al., supra note 54 at 281-82 (1998).
50
Ibid
48
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disclosure statement.51 Evidence found in tax evasion crime and financial disclosure violation may be used to investigate possible predicate
crimes, such as corruption, drug crime.
This sub-section shows that although it is critical to respond illicit
enrichment of public officials, it has never been easy to figure out the
best way to balance the public interest with protection of individual
rights. Since Article 20 of the UNCAC is a non-mandatory provision,
each signatory state has its own preference. Signatory states that prefer
not to criminalize illicit enrichment, such as Indonesia and the U.S., use
the illicit enrichment of public officials as a tool to investigate the corrupt offense itself.
III. INDONESIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN INVESTIGATING ILLICIT ENRICHMENT
Since reformation 1998, Indonesia has been tremendously developed in many aspects. It has a new constitution that governs the more
protection of human rights, the clearer separation of powers, along with
the establishment of laws and new agencies to handle citizens’ needs.52
In addition, the Indonesian economy has been growing stronger and
expanding its markets rapidly. Sadly, this improvement has not yet supported by bureaucracy reform—it seems whatever the “cover” there is
still the same “body.”53
Indeed, according to PUKAT Korupsi, corruption is pervasive almost in every sector from the highest to lowest level public offices.
This corruption has worsened because judicial institutions have been
affiliated with the mafia; therefore, although Indonesia established Undang-Undang Nomor 28 Tahun 1999 (Clean State Act), Undang-Undang Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 jo. Undang-Undang Nomor 20 Tahun 2001
(Corruption Act), the judicial institutions have performed poorly when
Reservation to IACAC, supra note 8.
Adnan Buyung Nasution, Reformasi Konstitusi di Indonesian [Constitutional Reform in Indonesia], HUKUM ONLINE, http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/
hol4057/reformasi-konstitusi-di-indonesia (last posted November 1, 2001)
53
Iqra Anugrah, Indonesia Long Journey toward Democracy, GLOBAL POLITICS,
http://www.global- politics.co.uk/issue9/iqra/ (last visited May 22, 2014).
51
52
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it comes to combatting corruption.54
In 2001, Indonesia passed Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2001
(hereinafter KPK Act) to establish the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Comission (hereinafter KPK) and the Special Court of Corruption
(hereinafter Pengadilan Tipikor). Interestingly, instead of taking over
investigation and prosecution of corruption from Indonesian National
Police (hereinafter Kepolisian) and Indonesian Attorney General (hereinafter Kejaksaan), under this act, the Kepolisian and the Kejaksaan
still have authority to investigate and prosecute corruption.55 In addition, the government took broader steps to combat corruption by enacting Undang-Undang Nomor 25 Tahun 2003 jo. Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 2010 (hereinafter Money Laundering Act) along with the
establishment of Indonesian Financial Intelligent (hereinafter PPATK).
The collaboration between the KPK and the PPATK has brought many
“big fish” to court. In contrast, the Kepolisian and the Kejaksaan performance has not mached the success of the KPK and the PPATK.56
Notably, the performance of the KPK and the PPATK has depended
on direct evidence, in which these institutions monitor suspicious persons and transactions;57 however as this paper noticed in the first subsection, often in many corruption cases, legal apparatus could not find any
During July 2012-June 2013, ICW noted there were 753 cases which most of the
defendants got low sentences: probations for four defendants, one-year imprisonment
for 185 defendants, one-two years imprisonment for 167 defendants, two-five years
for 217 defendants, five-ten years for 35 defendants, 10 years above for ten defendants. Upon stages in the trials, 143 defendants was freed to leave. See Indonesia
Corruption Watch - Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia- PUKAT UGM,
Implementasi dan Pengaturan Illicit Enrichment (Peningkatan Kekayaan Tidak Sah)
di Indonesia [Implementation and Regulation of Illicit Enrichment in Indonesia] 26
(published November 2013).
55
See Undang-Undang Nomor 16 Tahun 2004 tentang Kejaksaan [Prosecutor Act];
Penjelasan Umum [General Explanation]; Undang-Undang tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi [KPK Act], art. 6, Act. No. 30, 2002.
56
Saldi Isra, Seratus Hari Tanpa Kejutan [100 days Without Any Surprises], ANTI
KORUPSI, http://www.antikorupsi.org/id/content/seratus-hari-tanpa-kejutan (published January 28, 2005).
57
Bunga Manggiasih, Tuduh Ibas, Anas Urbaningrum Diminta Tunjukan Bukti [Accussed Ibas, Anas Urbaningrum Is Ask for Evidence TEMPO. CO (Jan. 30, 2014), http://
www.tempo.co/read/news/2014/01/30/063549489/Tuduh-Ibas-Anas-Urbaningrum-DimintaTunjukkan-Bukti
54
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direct evidence. For instance, we have been noticing many public officials are getting suspiciously enriched, but they might not be directly
involved in a corrupt scheme.58 To this situation, direct trapping would
not be worked. Actually, Indonesia has established obligation to public officials to submit their financial disclosure statement in the CleanState Act and the KPK Act.59 As the consequences of failure to prove
income enrichment came from legal sources, the government may be
used the evidence to strengthen the evidence on corruption prosecution;
60
however there is no civil and criminal prosecution for a public official
who fails or gives false information, along with the lack of method investigation.61
As a result, many public officials do not comply with the obligation to submit financial disclosure and there is no civil and criminal
prosecution for public officials that have been indicated suspiciously
enriched. For instance, in 2013, the mass media reported Edhie Baskoro
Yudhoyono, a former lawmaker and the son of President of Indonesia,
gained incredible enrichment during the Asian Games projects, activities that landed many of his colleagues in jail.62
People were persuaded that Edhie was involved in these activities
because of the way the news exposed how his annual incomes and assets did not match; for example, his new house was valued at seven
times his annual income per year (an unusual and untenable disparity).63
Later, he claimed his bakery corporation had been successful enough
to enable him to buy that house; however, his records suggested otherwise.64 Despite his privilege as member of Presidency family, it has
been noticed the KPK and the PPATK have lack of direct evidence to
Legislative Guide for the Implementation of UNCAC at 103.
KPK Act art. 13
60
Combating Corruption Act, supra note 3, art. 37
61
Ibid
62
Kartika Chandra, Ibas Bantah Terima Duit Wisma Atlet [Ibas Urgued He Didn’t Receive
Money From Wisma Atlet Scandal], TEMPO.CO (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.tempo.co/
read/news/2011/12/08/063370596/Ibas-Bantah-Terima- Duit-Wisma-Atlet
63
Rendi A. Witular & Hans David Tampubolon, First Family Tax Returns Raises
Flags, THE JAKARTA POST (January 30, 2013), http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2013/01/30/first-family-tax-returns-raises-flags.html.
64
Oki Baren, Bisnis Cantik Mas Ibas [Ibas’s Fancy Business], GRESNEWS (Dec. 5,
2011), http://gresnews.com/berita/somasi/1740512-bisnis-cantik-mas-ibas.
58
59
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bring him to corruption prosecution.65 In addition, the KPK does not
have any indirect methods of proof to investigate his illicit enrichment
or to tie the enrichment to possible corrupt offenses.66
Local public officials are also being tied up with illicit enrichment
from corrupt offenses. For example, Ratu Atut Chosiyah, Former Governor of Banten, was recently prosecuted by the KPK bribery charge in
Lebak Local Election.67 The KPK has indicated Chosiyah was the mastermind of this case68 because she gave instruction to her brother, Tubagus Chaery Wardana to bribe the Head of Indonesian Constitutional
Court, Akhil Mochtar, in order to help her colleagues win the election.69
Besides her involvement in this case, people have long suspected that
she was tied up with corruption because of her extravagant lifestyle.70
During 2011-2012, she traveled to many countries to purchase high end
brands of women bags and shoes, such as, Hermes and Daikokuya.71
These choices and purchases became more suspicious because she has
not filed financial disclosure statement for seven years, though the KPK
has sent her a couple of formal notices. 72
Indra Akuntono, KPK Akan Panggil Ibas Asalkan [KPK Would Arrest Ibas With
Special Circumtances], KOMPAS.COM (DEC. 12, 2013).
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/12/12/1346464/KPK.Akan.Panggil.Ibas.asalkan.
66
Combating Corruption Act, supra note 3, art. 37
67
Oki Baren, supra note 71; See, KPK Arrests Banten Governor, THE JAKARTA
POST (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/20/kpk-arrestsbanten-governor.html.
68
Gusti Sawabi, Perintah Menyuap Akil Mochtar Diduga dari Ratu Atut Chosiyah
[Order to Bribe Akhil Mochtar Was Suspected Came From Ratu Atut], TRIBUN
NEWS (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2013/10/07/perintahmenyuap-akil-mochtar-diduga-datang-dari-ratu-atut- chosiyah.
69
Ibid
70
Wayan Agus Purnomo & Angga Sukma Wijaya, Soal Belanja Mewah Ratu Atut, Ini
Kata Keluarga [Related to Shopping Life Style, Here Is What The Atut’s Family Thinks],
TEMPO.CO (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/11/04/063526888/SoalBelanja-Mewah-Ratu-Atut-Ini-Kata-Keluarga.
71
Terungkap, Ratu Atut Kerap Belanja Keliling Dunia [Uncovered Ratu Atut Often Goes Shopping Overseas], Tempo.co (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.tempo.co/read/
news/2013/11/04/063526886/Terungkap-Ratu-Atut-Kerap- Belanja-Keliling-Dunia.
72
Silvanus Alvin, 7 Tahun Tidak Lapor Kekayaan, Harta Ratu Atut Meningkat [Seven
Years Ignored to File Financial Disclosure Statement, Atut Has Gained Enrichment],
LIPUTAN 6 (Oct. 12, 2013), http://news.liputan6.com/read/718485/7-tahun-tidak65
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Like the executive and legislative branches, public officials in judicial institutions have also led extravagant lives. A few months ago,
Nurhadi, Secretary of Supreme Court, has made public attention by his
daughter exclusive wedding ceremony in which he gave 2500 iPods
to the guests—an estimated cost of 700 million rupiahs ($70,000).73 In
the previous year, he bought an office table for about 1 billion rupiahs
($100,000) and a fancy house in Senayan City, Jakarta.74
Like Atut, Nuhadi has not complied with the financial disclosure
statement obligation for the past three years.75
In light of these stories of excess and indulgence, scholars and the
KPK have been discussing whether Indonesia needs to change its approach to criminalize illicit enrichment or to find a different way to
respond illicit enrichment.76 In fact, the PPATK proposed a new bill
about asset forfeiture that would give prosecutors authority to take unexplained wealth from public officials, but not giving criminal sanction
unlike the UNCAC’s requirement.77 The PPATK was inspired by the imlapor-kekayaan-harta-ratu-atut- meningkat#sthash.n5ouE73t.dpuf.See Edwin Firdaus, KPK Himbau Ratu Atut Segera Laporkan LHKPN [KPK Recommends Ratu
Atut to File Her Financial Disclosure], Tribun Sumsel (Oct. 6, 2013), http://sumsel.
tribunnews.com/2013/10/06/kpk-himbau-ratu-atut-segera-laporkan-lhkpn.
73
Rina Atriana, Gelar Resepsi Mewah, Sekretaris MA Nurhadi Belum Lengkapi Laporan Kekayaan [The Secretary of Supreme Court Ignored to File Financial Disclosure
Statement for Three Years], DETIK.CO (March 18, 2014), http://news.detik.com/re
ad/2014/03/18/065203/2528677/10/gelar-resepsi-mewah-sekretaris-ma-nurhadi-belum- lengkapi-laporan-kekayaan.
74
Abdul Qodir, Rumah Nurhadi Terbesar di Dekat Senayan City [Nurhadi Has The
Biggest House in Senayan City], Tribun News (March 18, 2014), http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2014/03/18/rumah-nurhadi-terbesar-di-dekat-senayan-city.
75
Putri Artika R, KPK Imbau Nurhadi Lengkapi Laporan Harta Kekayaan [KPK
Recommends Nurhadi to File His Financial Disclosure Statement], MERDEKA.COM
(March 14, 2013), http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/kpk-imbau- nurhadi-segeralengkapi-laporan-harta-kekayaan.html.
76
KPK has held several discussion talking about illicit enrichment besides working on
research paper with ICW. SeeSukma Indah Permana, ICW: Pendekatan Illicit Enrichment Bisa Maksimalkan Upaya Pemiskinan Koruptor [ICW: Investigating Illicit Enrichment Would Support Fighting Against Corruption], Detik.co (Nov.1, 2011), http://
news.detik.com/read/2013/11/01/173946/2401813/10/icw-pendekatan-illicit-enrichmentbisa-maksimalkan-upaya-pemiskinan-koruptor.
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Martha Thertina, PPATK Usulkan Ada RUU Perampasan Aset Koruptor [PPATK
Proposes Asset Recovery Bill], TEMPO.CO (April 16, 2013), http://www.tempo.co/
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plementation of unexplained wealth prosecution in Australia.78Scholars
and the anti-corruption community have begun to consider which steps
should be established when the government wants to forfeit assets.79
Instead of looking to countries that criminalize illicit enrichment,
this paper focuses in learning from the US’s approach. The next section will start by description of Indonesian governing laws of corruption. The purpose of that description is to figure out what is the element
of corrupt offense and how does the investigation of illicit enrichment
give benefits to prove the element of corruption and how to use information from the financial disclosure and tax system to investigate illicit
enrichment.
A. Indonesian Laws Governing of Corruption
In tackling corruption issue, the main regulation used by legal apparatus is the Combating Corruption Act. This act mentions both material
and specific procedural laws in investigating and prosecuting corruption; however it does still apply some general procedural laws under
Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1981 tentang Kitab Undang-Undang
Hukum Acara Pidana (Criminal Procedural Law). Generally speaking,
there are seven types of corrupt offenses under the Corruption Act.80
This law stipulates the elements of corruption are unlawful conduct of
a person or law entity (corporation or organization), with personal or
group intention to be enriched, that may cause state financial lost.81 For
bribery, particularly governed by Article 5, 12, 13 where a public official (recipient) may be punished for bribery if he or she promises,
seeks, receives something value that may be influenced his or her official decisions.82 Those articles also stipulate for a person who promises,
and gives something value to a public official. All of corrupt offenses
read/news/2013/04/16/092473857/PPATK-Usulkan-Ada-RUU-Perampasan-Aset-Koruptor.
78
Ibid
79
Perlunya Aturan Illicit Enrichment Untuk Cegah Korupsi [The Urgency to Regulate
Illicit Enrichment to Combat Corruption], HUKUM ONLINE (Nov. 1, 2013).
http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt5273ab9aace4d/perlunya- aturan-illicitenrichment-untuk-cegah-korupsi.
80
See Combating Corruption Act, supra note 3, art. 5-12, 13, 18, 23, and 30.
81
Ibid, Art 2 and 3
82
Ibid, Art 5, 12 and 13
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governed by the Act may be criminally prosecuted with imprisonment
and fines sanctions.
The Act does not have clear explanation whether a public official
or a person who committed a corrupt offense indirectly may be prosecuted under the Act. To this issue, Indonesian special judges for court
of corruption have ruled in many cases that indirect involvement may
be also punished under the Act if legal apparatus finds evidence linked
to the corrupt offenses.83Again, often prosecutors have to face the lack
of direct evidence, thus the idea to use illicit enrichment as a means to
prosecute corruption is crucial showing that the prosecutor can indirectly prove that the illicit enrichment related to corrupt offense. Before
Indonesia signed the UNCAC, it implicitly established provisions on
the Corruption Act that addressed illicit enrichment, Article 37 and 37
(A). Article 37 states a defendant has a right to prove that he or she is
innocence that may be used by the court to decide the indictment cannot be proved.84 Further, under Article 37 (A) (1), the right under Article
37 may be used to explain about his or her wealth, along with spouse,
children and corporation that may have the connection with him or her.85
If he or she cannot prove his or her wealth is equal with his or her legal
income, Article 37 (A) (2) stipulates the findings may be used by the
court to strengthen other evidence.86 Although the defendant has right
to explain, pursuant to Article 37 (A) (3), the prosecutor still has the
burden of proof as mentioned in Article 66 Criminal Procedural Act.
B. Indonesian Financial Disclosure System
This section concerns how the Indonesian legal apparatus conducts
its investigation of illicit enrichment. Indonesia has established a financial disclosure system under Law No 28 of 1999 concerning CleanState Act. Article 5 of the Act requires that every public official have
several main responsibilities, including submitting their financial disclosure statements before, during, and after their periods in office. Public officials governed by this law are employed under the highest state
A lot of public officials have been prosecuted because legal apparatus has found
evidence, such as witness testimony or recorded communication.
84
Combating Corruption Act, supra note 3, art. 37
85
Ibid. art 37 A (1).
86
Ibid. art 37 A (2).
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bodies, the high state bodies, ministers, governors, judges, other public
officials governed by other laws, other public officials that have strategic positions.87Further, Article 12 mentions the financial disclosure statements have to be submitted to Indonesian Public Official Income Investigator (hereinafter Komisi Pemeriksa Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara
(KPKPN)).88 Moreover, under Article 20, if a public official violates his
or her duty, such as does not file financial disclosure statement, he or she
may be punished by administrative sanction that governed by laws.89
Later, in 2001, there was a significant change in corruption prosecution by the establishment of KPK. In 2006, the KPKPN merged its
resources to the KPK; so based on Indonesian Administration Minister Memorandum, the KPKPN was dissolved.90 The KPK, particularly,
takes over the KPKPN authority on financial disclosure system.91 In summary, the KPK has the authority to prosecute and supervise cases and
prevent corruption.92 For the prevention, under Article 13 (a) KPK Act,
it includes registering and examining financial disclosure statement of
public officials and establishes a special subdivision under prevention
division to handle it.93 As governed by the Clean-State Act, financial
disclosure statement must be submitted before, during, and after office
period.94 Specifically, under Article 48, this independent institution may
require a defendant to give an explanation about his or her wealth along
with spouse, children, and anyone or corporate that could be related to
Public officials in strategic positions including director, commissioner, and other
senior public official of state and local enterprises, head of Indonesia National Bank,
head of public universities, senior public officials within civil, military and police
institutions, prosecutors, investigators, clerks, head and treasurer of public projects.
Clean-State Act, supra note 3, art. 2
88
Ibid. art. 12
89
Ibid, art 20
90
Astrid Felicia Lim, KPKPN Resmi Bubar [KPKPN officially Shut Down], DETIK.
CO (June 29, 2006), http://news.detik.com/read/2004/06/29/113149/169807/10/kpkpn-resmi-bubar.
91
Clean-State Act, supra note 3, art. 71 (2) stipulates KPK has duty and authority of
KPKPN mandated by Article 70 Clean-State Act. As a result, Article 70 is no longer
applicable.
92
KPK Act, supra note 61, art. 7.
93
Ibid. art. 26 (3).
94
Ibid
87
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corrupt offenses in which the defendant is being prosecuted. 95
Unlike the Clean-State Act, the KPK Act gives does more to improve the financial disclosure system with the establishment of financial
disclosure subdivision. Unfortunately, like the Clean-State law, it does
not give what kind of financial information must be submitted, what
kind of sanction may be imposed and what kind of method may be used
if the KPK wants to use it to strengthen the evidence. As a result, only a
few public officials file their financial disclosure statements and for registered financial disclosure statements there is no further investigation.96
Eventually, the lack of Clean-State Act and KPK Act have a bit recovered by the establishment of Surat Edaran Menteri Negara Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara Nomor: SE/03/M.PAN/01/2005 tentang
Laporan Harta Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara (The Administration Minister Memorandum about Financial Disclosure Statement)
and Keputusan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Nomor: KEP. 07/
KPK/02/2005 tentang Tata Cara Pendaftaran, Pemeriksaan dan Pengumuman Laporan Harta Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara (The KPK
Memorandum about Financial Disclosure Statement). The first memorandum gives a broader definition of public official governed by financial disclosure obligation. It includes second upper level of public officials in governmental institutions or agencies, head of office divisions
in the Finance Ministry, public officials in export and import bureau,
tax investigators, auditors, signatory representatives in public projects,
head of public service institutions, and signatory representatives in lawmaking process.97
Meanwhile, the KPK’s memorandum states that the KPK must take
several steps in handling financial disclosures.98 First, after public officials registered, the KPK collects their financial disclosure statements
Ibid
Combating Corruption Act, supra note 3, art. 37.
97
Surat Edaran Menteri Negara Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara Nomor: SE/03/M.
PAN/01/2005 tentang Laporan Harta Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara [Administration Minister Memorandum about Financial Disclosure Statement], 2005.
98
Keputusan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Nomor: KEP. 07/KPK/02/2005 tentang Tata Cara Pendaftaran, Pemeriksaan dan Pengumuman Laporan Harta Kekayaan
Penyelenggara Negara [KPK Memorandum about Financial Disclosure Statement],
2005, art. 4, 5, 6, 7.
95
96
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public officials through its sub-division.99 Next, this institution examination and add the information to its information system.100 Hence, the
KPK pulls out these financial disclosure statements to its website, and
its billboard, government institutions billboards where the public officials work for, national or local newspapers depend on the public officials’ residences.101 For the examination, the KPK takes three steps:
administration, substance, and specific examination.102 While in administration checking step, the KPK looks through the validity of information written in the statement, and documents related to it.104 after that,
in checking the substance, the KPK compares and analyzes a public
official’s wealth before, during, and after office period, along with his
or her historical position and increasing of wealth.104
103

In the specific examination, the KPK works based on public reports
showing that a public official is suspiciously enriched and his or her
enrichment may be related to corruption—in this step, the KPK may be
supported by other institutions—before conducting this examination,
the KPK must give notice to the public official.105 To gathering information, the KPK has the authority to use any information based on a
public official’s claims or possible unreported income, interviewing his
or her colleagues, employees in related corporation, officer on his or her
institution, and neighborhood residences, taking pictures and/or making
visual material of the examination objects.106
To support the implementation of financial disclosure, Article 11 of
the Memorandum recommends heads of governmental institutions both
national and local may file names of public officials that are obligated
to file financial disclosure statements.107 Those Memoranda give many
steps ahead in addressing illicit enrichment which are giving broader
definition of public officials; providing forms explain what kind of inIbid. art. 4 and 5
Ibid. art. 6 and 7.
101
Ibid. art. 5.
102
Id. art. 6
103
Ibid, 6 (4)
104
Ibid
105
Ibid. art. 6 (8) and (9).
106
Ibid. art. 7 (3).
107
Id. art. 11.
99

100
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formation that must be filled, further it sort of explaining what steps of
specific examination when it comes to suspicious enrichment. These
steps look like what the U.S. has which is called as the indirect methods
of proof.108In fact, this Memorandum is just beautifully written words
because it is not supported by strong obligation for public officials to
file financial disclosure statement—for instance, in the middle of Ratu
Atut investigation, the KPK recommends her to file her late seven years
financial disclosure statement, she does not care at all.109
C. Indonesian Prosecution for Tax Evasion
While there are other tools for examining the increasing wealth of
public officials, those tools are contained in other laws and managed
by other government institutions; furthermore, they are not very effective. For example, a taxpayer110 is obligated to file a tax report every
year to Indonesian Department of Tax under the Ministry of Finance
(Direktorat Jendral Pajak).111 The tax report is a confidential document
unless Courts, the Minister of Justice, and the Minister of Finance ask
the report for investigation purposes.112 Besides the authority to register
tax report and collect tax, the Directorate General of Tax (Direktorat
Jendral Pajak) has special agents who investigate tax evasion called
the Civil Tax Investigator (PPNS Pajak), after that the Attorney will
continue to indict the defendant.113 If a taxpayer fails to file or gives
false information on this tax report, he or she may be charged by civil
and criminal charges.114
Despite its strong authority, the Department of Tax has not yet performed effectively to register and collect taxes. Approximately, only
Internal Revenue Manual, supra note 9, 10, 11, and 12.
Alvin, supra note 78
110
See Undang-Undang Nomor 28 Tahun 2007 jo. Undang-Undang Nomor 16 Tahun
2000 jo. Undang-Undang 6 Tahun 1983 tentang Ketentuan Umum dan Tata Cara Perpajakan [Indonesian Tax Act], 2007, art. 1 Point 2.
111
Ibid. art. 2
112
Ibid. art. 34
113
Ibid. art. 1 Point 31
114
Criminal penalty for tax evasion is minimum six months and maximum six years
and fine minimum two times or maximum four times of the actual tax actual payable.
Id. art. 39.
108
109
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8.8 million taxpayers file tax reports and pay their taxes every year.115
In fact, the Department of Tax estimated there are more than 67 million taxpayers who have sufficient incomes to pay taxes.116 It has been
recognized Indonesian citizens still have lack awareness to pay taxes,117
but the fact that this institution has been tied up with corruption cases
also contributes in reducing people trust to the institution.118 A number
of tax investigators have been charged with corruption.119 It is also has
been noticed that the Attorney does have the lack of indirect methods
of proof to convict tax evasion and connect it with other crimes, such
as corruption.120
Based on the explanation above, it can be concluded, illicit enrichment cases do not provide an opportunity to the legal apparatus to
uncover corruption because the financial disclosure system does not
work—nor does the tax system. The financial disclosure system is not
supported by civil and criminal sanction that may be imposed if a public official fails to file or gives false information and specific method
of proof for conducting an investigation ties to corruption charges.121
Meanwhile, the Civil Tax Investigator has poorly performed to impose
Potensi Wajib Pajak di Indonesia Baru 67 Juta Orang [67 Million People: Small
Possibility of Indonesian New Taxpayers], INFOBANKNEWS.COM (August 15,
2012), http://www.infobanknews.com/2012/08/potensi-wajib-pajak- di-indonesiabaru-67-juta-orang/.
116
Ibid
117
Herry Susanto, Membangun Kesadaran dan Kepedulian Sukarela Wajib Pajak
[Enhancing Awarness to Pay Taxes], PAJAK (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.pajak.go.id/
content/membangun-kesadaran-dan-kepedulian-sukarela- wajib-pajak.
118
Zaki Al Hamzah, SBY: Cermati Korupsi Pajak [SBY: Monitors Corruption in Tax
System], REPUBLIKA ONLINE (ROL) (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.republika.co.id/
berita/koran/news-update/13/12/09/mxjq7f-sby-cermati-korupsi- pajak. Hendrizal,
Pajak dan Masalah Transparansi [Tax and Problem of Transparency], PELITA (April
11, 2014), http://www.pelita.or.id/baca.php?id=92915.
119
PPATK published 83 tax officials have tied up with suspicious transactions. Adyan
Mohamad, Kemenkeu Sanksi 83 Pegawai Karena Transaksi Mencurigakan [Ministry
of Finance Gives Sanctions to 83 Officials Who Have Been Tied Up with Suspicious
Transaction], MERDEKA.COM (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.merdeka.com/uang/kemenkeu- hukum-83-pegawai-karena-transaksi-mencurigakan.html
120
Pusdiklat Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia, Penelurusan Aset [Asset Tracing] 10-14,
available at
http://www.kejaksaan.go.id/pusdiklat/uplimg/File/PENELUSURAN%20ASET.pdf.
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Clean-State Act, supra note 3, art. 20.
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tax return and enforce civil and criminal prosecution for tax evasion.122
In addition, there is no indirect method of proof taken place to investigate illicit enrichment and reach the goal to strengthen the evidence in
prosecuting corruption.123
IV. ILLICIT ENRICHMENT AS A TOOL IN INVESTIGATING
CORRUPTION IN THE US
Unlike Indonesia, according to the TI, the U.S. is categorized as a
country with a low- corruption perception. For example, in 2012, this
reputable NGO put the U.S. in 19th from 176 countries based on corruption perception index in the public sector.124 This country has succeeded to boost its position, since the year before, the U.S. fell into
24th due to the economic crisis which was decreasing the public trust.125
Furthermore, the TI also categorized the U.S. as a country who has been
performing actively for combating bribery to foreign government by
its Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA);126 however, those perceptions,
which only give a general description, do not confirm that corruption
does not exist in the U.S.
For example, in 2013, the TI held special survey for bribery, within
a year more than 7% of Americans told that they paid bribe to eight major services such as judiciary, registry and permit services, and education services.127 Although bribery is not pervasive from highest to lowinfobanknews.com, supra note 123.
Pusdiklat Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia, supra note 127.
124
TI, Corruption Perception Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results (last visited Dec. 14, 2013).
125
The 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks 182 countries and territories based on
how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be in which the more clean their public
sector than the higher their ranks. TI, Corruption Perceprtion Index 2011, TRANSPARENCY, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2013).
126
TI, EXPORTING CORRUPTION PROGRESS REPORT 2013: ASSESSING
ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING FOREIGN
BRIBERY 84, 2013, available at http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/exporting_corruption_progress_report_2013_assessing_enforcement_of_the_oecd (last visited May 22, 2014).
127
Allie Bidwel, Majority of Americans Say Corruption Has Increased, US NEWS
(June 10, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/07/10/majorityof-americans-say-corruption-has-increased,
122
123

85

Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015

Criminal Liability of Public Officials for Illicit Enrichment: Comparing Approaches...

est level, at least every year the US legal apparatus prosecutes high and
low-level public officials in bribery cases. Recently, the former governor of Virginia, Bob Mc.Donell and his wife were indicted by federal
jury trial with fourteen counts of illegally accepting gifts and loans from
a political supporter, Jonnie Williams.128 In brief, Williams gave about
$50,000 loan to cover Mc.Donell’s mortgage, and he also paid Donell’s
daughter wedding reception expenses.129 While he claimed that what he
gained was a legal gratuity, the government alleges that he received this
money in exchange for his support of scientifically-unproven dietary
supplements made by William’s company.130 Prior to the trial, the investigation was begun by the IRS’s suspicion over Mc.Donell’s tax report,
which did not show the expensive wedding reception of his daughter or
the mortgage payment. 131
Another example of public officials who were getting suspiciously
enriched is Randall Cunningham. He was a former Republican congressman from San Diego who was charged by several counts: bribery,
mail fraud, and wire fraud.132 Later, he was convicted of accepting $2.4
million including cash, home payments, furnishings, cars and posh holiday expenses from several contractors and sentenced for seven years
imprisonment.133 It has been reported that Cunningham’s unusual house
sales to contractor Mitchell Wade was a lead fact in investigating this
case. Wade bought the house for about $1.6 million from Cunningham,
David Sherfinski, Democratic Governors in VA also Took Expensive Gifts under
Lax State Law, WASHINGTON TIMES (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2014/jan/27/virginia-governors-before-bob-mcdonnell accepted- l/?utm_
source=RSS_Feed&utm_medium=RSS.
129
Ibid
130
Ibid
131
Arlette Saenz, Ferraris, Rolexes And A Shopping Spree: Inside The Extravagant
Life Of Bob McDonnell And His Wife, ABCNEWS.COM (Jan. 21, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/01/ferraris-rolexes-and-a-shopping-spree-insidethe-extravagant-life-of-bob-mcdonnell-and-his-wife/ (posted Jan 21, 2014).
132
Ed Henry & Mark Preston, Congressman Resigns After Bribery Plea: California Republican admits selling influence for $2.4 million,CNN.COM (nov. 28, 2005),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/11/28/cunningham/.
133
Randy “Duke” Cunningham Completes Prison Sentence, ABC7 (June 4, 2013),
http://www.wjla.com/articles/2013/06/randy-duke-cunningham-completes-prisonsentence-89652.html.
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but Wade then sold the house for about $700,000 less.134 Another lead is
Cunningham’s increase of valuable assets including a suburban Washington condominium, a yacht and a Rolls Royce car.135 The prosecutor
said Cunningham used his influence to help the contractors to get some
government projects.136 The U.S. did not prosecute McDonell or Cunningham, for their illicit enrichment, but it used tax evasion in looking through their illicit enrichment and corroborated the evidence to
convict tax evasion charge. Further, the evidence could be lead to the
underlying crime such as bribery, mail fraud, wire fraud, along with
conspiracy and RICO. Those cases confirm the U.S. reservation to the
UNCAC which the U.S. does not criminalize illicit enrichment, but it
does use illicit enrichment as a tool to investigation further crimes like
corruption.
As a guidance, first this sub-section describes law governing corruption—find out what is the element of corrupt offense especially bribery
and illegal gratuity—and then showing how the U.S. use illicit enrichment of public official as a tool to investigate corruption. General explanation of the U.S.’s law governing corruption can be seen by looking
to its reservation to the UNCAC. It is stated that this convention governing corruption has to be implemented in consideration with federal and
state criminal laws. While the U.S. law governing corruption is rooted
in state law, the federal government may exercise its jurisdiction when
it comes to conduct that affects “interstate or foreign commerce, or another federal interest.”137 In other words, this encompass jurisdiction authorized federal laws to prosecute federal officials and state officials
for bribery and illegal gratuity, and also establish offenses that relate to
corruption, such as, tax evasion, mail fraud, wire fraud, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO), conspiracy, mail and wire
fraud, and money laundering.
In Cunningham’s case, federal jurisdiction was taken place because
he was a former federal official. He was charged and convicted for sevHendry, supra note 140
Ibid
136
Richard Marosi, Contractor Gets 12 Years for Bribing Congressman, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Feb. 20, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/20/local/meduke20.
137
See UNCAC, supra note 2.
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eral federal charges: bribery, mail, and wire fraud. While Mc.Donell was
a former state official, he is being indicted for fourteen federal charges
of illegally gratuity showing that his conducts relate to interstate commerce by using his power to support the dietary-supplement company.
Like Mc. Donell, in United States v. Coyne, the Supreme Court held that
the federal bribery charges must stand showing the fact the defendant,
James J. Coyne was a former county executive in Albany was conspired
with Crozier Associates, a company doing business in interstate commerce, to help this company be selected in a project in Albany.138
Looking to those cases, it can be concluded it does not matter
whether petty or high profile corruptions since the nature of corruption
as a white collar crime it has to be supported by many other offenses;
thus to this point, federal laws may exercise it jurisdiction. This paper
does not focus to analyze this downside or upside this encompass jurisdiction, but in order to get into the research questions of this paper,
this subsection uses the encompass feature to specify analysis to federal
laws governing corruption: bribery and illegal gratuity and some offenses related of corruption.
A. The Laws Governing Bribery and Illegal Gratuity
First, for bribery, the U.S. Constitution as the Supreme Law of the
Land mentions in Article II, Section 4, all public officials “shall be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” This provision is further governed by federal and state laws. For federal officials, they are
bound by 18 U.S.C. §201 (a), (b), and (c) about bribery of public officials and witnesses. Specifically, the §201 (a) gives definition of some
statutory words. Continued by the §201 (b) which governs prohibition
giving and accepting bribery, and §201 (c) regulates prohibition giving
and accepting illegal gratuity.139 In summary, under 18 U.S.C. §201 (b),
a public official is liable for bribery if he or she “directly or indirectly,
corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity,”140
as a payback for: “being influenced in the performance of any official
United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 1993).
The next explanation only focuses in provisions for public official.
140
18 U.S.C. §201 (b) (2) West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-93 (excluding P.L. 113-79))
138
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act,”141 “being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude
in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any
fraud, on the United States;”142 or “being induced to do or omit to do any
act in violation of the official duty of such official or person;”143 or “being influenced in testimony under oath or affirmation as a witness upon
any such trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in return for absenting
himself therefrom.”144
Further, §201 (c) (1) (B) governs illegal gratuity where any public official or a person selected to be a public official who “directly
or indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or
accept anything of value personally for or because of any official act
performed or to be performed by such official or person,”145 or “because
of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such
person as a witness upon any such trial, hearing, or other proceeding,
or for or because of such person’s absence therefrom.”146 The differentiation between bribery and illegal gratuity is governed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers. The Court
distinguished section b and c of §201 as two separate crimes with different the set of punishments. The section b of §201 is bribery because
it requires corrupt intention of the giver,147 along with the public official
or selected public official’s intention to be influenced in performing
any official act as a pay back.148 Meanwhile, illegal gratuity governed
by §201 (c) only requires “something of value was given, offered,
or promised to a public official”149 by any individual, or “demanded,
sought, received, accepted, or agreed to be received or accepted by a
public official,”150 “for or because of any official act performed or to be
Ibid. (b) (2) (A).
Ibid. (b) (2) (B).
143
Ibid. (b) (2) (C).
144
Ibid. (b) (4).
145
Ibid. (c) (1) (B)
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Ibid. (c) (1) (B)
147
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 404, 119 S. Ct.
1402, 1406, 143 L. Ed. 2d, p. 576 (1999)
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Ibid. at 404-05
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performed by such public official.”151 There is no need for prosecutors to
figure out corrupt intention for illegal gratuity.
For bribery, an individual and a public official should be punished
by fine “under this title or not more than three times the monetary
equivalent of the thing of value, or imprisonment for not more than
fifteen years and/or be [expelled] from holding any office of honor,
trust, or profit under the United States.”152 This punishment consists of
monetary, criminal, and administrative sanctions that are harsher than
illegal gratuity where provides monetary sanction under this title or imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.153 Pursuant to those
Articles, to prove a public official committed bribery or illegal gratuity,
there must be something value was given, offered, or promised. In fact,
it is difficult to legal apparatus to detect the transaction that requires
“enormous costs and complexities” in investigating it, often it ends up
“fruitless.”154 Knowing the difficulties to detect corrupt transaction, as
this paper mentioned in previous subsection, the illicit enrichment of
public officials is recognized as a “yellow flag” that corruption may
happen. To this point, as the U.S. mentions in its reservation to the IACAC and the UNCAC, this country established financial disclosure and
tax evasion prosecution that may be joined with corruption charges.
B.	Financial Disclosure and Tax Evasion Prosecution as Tool to Combat Illicit Enrichment
1. The U.S. Financial Disclosure System and Prosecution
The U.S. financial disclosure system is rooted in Ethics in Government, § 101, 5 U.S.C.A. App. 4. Under this statute, within thirty days
after being selected as a public official, an individual is obligated to
file a financial report. The term public official includes senior level of
public officials under three branches of power.155 Moreover, §101 refers
151

Ibid
18 U.S.C. §201 (b), supra note 148, (4).
153
18 U.S.C. §201 (c) (3) West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-93 (excluding P.L. 113-79)).
154
Steven M. Levin, Illegal Gratuities in American Politics: Learning Lessons from
the Sun-Diamond Case, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1813, 1817 (2000).
155
For example, President, Vice President, executive branch employees along with
special government employees (5 U.S.C.A. App. 4. § 202 of title 18 West, Westlaw
through P.L. 113-93 (excluding P.L. 113-79)).
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to §102 (b) about what information do these public officials have to
submit. Public officials and candidate of public officials should include
a full and complete statement with respect to the information required
by this statute: source, type, and amount or value of income during the
preceding year.156
The source of income consist of dividends, rents, interest, and capital gains which exceeds $200 in amount or value; gifts aggregating
more than the minimal value as 5 U.S.C. § 7342(a)(5), or $250, whichever is greater, received from any source other than a relative of the reporting individual; liabilities owed to any creditor other than a spouse,
or a parent, brother, sister, or child of the reporting individual or of the
reporting individual’s spouse which exceed $10,000; sale or exchange
which exceeds $1,000; previous and outside positions income on business and organization, agreements for future employment, or a leave
of absence during the period of the reporting individual’s Government
service; continuation of payments by a former employer other than the
U.S. Government, or continuing participation in an employee welfare
or benefit plan maintained by a former employer; blind trust.157
Based on the explanation above, financial disclosure requirement is
not only governed public officials but also their spouses and children.
All information has to be submitted annually by May 15 of each year
to a special ethics agency under the institution where the public officials are employed. For instance, the President and the Vice President
have to file the report with the Office of Government Ethics (OGE).158
Meanwhile, other executive branch employees must submit their report
to specific ethic agency under their institution.159 Members and staffs
of the House of Representatives should file their report to the Clerk of
the House while Senators and its staffs file copies of their reports to
See 5 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)-(8) West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-93 (excluding P.L.
113-79)).
157
Unless the trust instrument was executed prior to July 24, 1995 and precludes the
beneficiary from receiving information on the total cash value of any interest in a
qualified blind trust. Id.
158
Jack Maskell, Financial Disclosure by Federal Officials and Publication of Disclosure Reports Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service at 7, available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43186.pdf (2012).
159
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the Secretary of the Senate.160 Moreover, public officials under judicial
branch have to submit their reports to the Judicial Conference.161 Article
§101 also bound federal campaign candidates in which they have to file
reports within thirty days of becoming candidates, or before May 15
of that calendar year but no later than 30 days before the election. For
continuing candidate—incumbent who are running again in the election, they must report their financial information governed by §102 (b).
As the U.S. mentions in its reservation to the IACAC, financial disclosure provides sanction if a public official knowingly and willfully
gives any false information or fails to report within period time governed
by the statute. First, the U.S. Attorney General may bring civil action to
court in which the court may impose a civil penalty a civil penalty in any
amount, not to exceed $50,000. For criminal sanction, a public official
who knowingly and willfully gave false information shall be fined under
title 18 the United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or
both; meanwhile for who knowingly and willfully failed to file, he or she
may be fined under title 18 the United States Code.
Although §101 seems clear to establish the obligation of public officials to file financial disclosure report, this statute has been challenged,
for example, in United States v. Jefferson where the court granted the
Ethics in Government Act (“EIGA”)’s motion for entry of default judgment and assessed a civil penalty in the amount of $11,000 against the
defendant,162 showing the fact that he did not file report within thirty
days after his employment termination to the Ethics in Government Act
(“EIGA”).163 In the reasoning the court cited to United States v. Tarver in
which an individual is liable for knowingly and willfully fails to comply
with the EIGA’s filing requirements when that individual “intentionally
disregards the statute or is indifferent to its requirements.”164 Additionally, the court cited to United States v. Bank of New England, N.A. in defining “willfulness for purposes of federal regulatory statutes as a disregard for the governing statute and an indifference to its requirements.”165
Ibid
Ibid, p. 9
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United States v. Gant, 268 F. Supp. 2d 29, 34 (D.D.C. 2003).
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The court reasoned the fact that the defendant understood his position as
an employee of executive branch subject to §101, received a reminder
memoranda and called from the agency is sufficient to show he was
knowingly and willfully failed to file his financial report.166
2. The U.S. Prosecution for Tax Evasion
The US mentions its reservation to the IACAC that it does not criminalize illicit enrichment, but it establishes civil and criminal prosecution for tax evasion. This investigation is used illicit enrichment of a
taxpayer as a means to be investigated. In addition, this investigation
may lead legal apparatus to other committed crimes—why did taxpayers hide their enrichment; there are many possibilities of motives:
they may be greed167 or they cannot resist it may be related to crimes.168
Henceforth, the investigation of tax evasion is joined with other crimes
for example drug crime, and corrupt offenses: fraud, mail fraud, wire
fraud, and bribery;169 however all of these crimes are categorized as
white collar crimes in which it is challenging for legal apparatus to
find “direct evidence”170 of the crimes. Responding this problem, the US
legal apparatus has been using the indirect methods of proof. Before
explaining, the use of indirect methods of proof in tax evasion prosecution, this paper will describe what the tax evasion prosecution is and
how does this crime relate to corruption.
ibid
See Allan G. Burrow, Effective Cross-Examination: A Practical Approach for Prosecutors Part II, 44 ADVOCATE 8, 9 (2001).
168
See Teresa E. Adams, Tacking on Money Laundering Charges to White Collar
Crimes: What Did Congress Intend, and What Are the Courts Doing? 17 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 531, 551 (2000).
169
For instance, the net worth method of proof is applicable to fraud, waste, and abuse
cases. See Richard A. Nossen, “One-on-One”’ Uncorroborated Testimony: The Dilemma of Prosecutors, Defense Attorneys, and the Courts in Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
Cases, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1023 (1983).
170
Evidence” is a much narrower term. It includes only such proof as is admissible at
trial by the act of the parties or through such concrete facts as witnesses, records, or
other documents. Proof is the end result or effect of evidence, while evidence is the
medium or means by which a fact is proved or disproved.
Direct evidence proves a fact, without an inference or presumption, and conclusively
establishes that fact without reference to any supporting evidence. Direct evidence
is evidence of the precise fact in issue and is distinguished from circumstantial i.e.,
“indirect, “ evidence.
166
167
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Tax evasion is governed by 26 U.S.C.A. § 7201, attempt to evade
or defeat tax. An individual commits tax evasion if he or she “willfully
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title
or the payment,” in which under this law he or she may be guilty of a
felony and “shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the
case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both,
together with the costs of prosecution.” Likewise, violation financial
disclosure statement, in tax evasion, the government must prove the
defendant’s willfulness to avoid tax. In many cases, the jury has been
convinced by the government’s evidence showing that defendants tried
to hide their increasing wealth by destroying their books and records,
purchasing property under their fake names or their spouses or family’s
member names (like in Mc.Donell’s case). There are several cases that
give a better understanding what are the elements of tax evasion. For
instance, in general, courts ruled that in tax evasion, the government
must present: (i) “the existence of a tax deficiency; (ii) an affirmative
act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the tax; and (iii)
willfulness.”171 Importantly, the government has the burden of proving
each element of tax evasion beyond a reasonable doubt.172
3. Joinder Counts of Tax Evasion and Corruption
In many cases, conviction of corruption was joined by other charges
related, such as tax evasion. In general, courts held that joinder counts
may be used for bribery and tax evasion. For instance, in United States
v. Anderson, the Seven Circuit affirmed that the trial court judgment because the jury instruction was not error. The court reasoned the government showed adequate evidence to convict the defendants for bribery
and RICO. Further, the government was permissible to exercise mail
fraud, joinder counts with tax evasion were not error, and final application of probation officer sentencing council is not retroactively.173
The case began with an undercover investigation to the defendants’
corrupt business. In summary, there were two defendants in this case:
John Marine, an official at the Lake Country County Court in Crown
Ethan Bercot, John Thompson, Tax Violations, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1559, 1567
(2013).
172
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United States v. Anderson, 809 F.2d 1281, 1290 (7th Cir. 1987)
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Point, Indiana, has worked to process bailiff of defendants from their
probation officers to the case coordinator and then to the office manager
and Kenneth Anderson, a barber in Crown Point.174 One day Anderson
was contacted by an undercover FBI agent named “Dan Mingo” to help
him get rid his DIU charge with $1600 as a payment, Anderson agreed
and told Mingo, there would be someone took care of it.175Apparently,
Marine was the guy who had access to court computer and would be
able to erase Mingo’s file.176 This mission was failed because, as Marine
told Anderson, the computer was error.177 Later, Mingo asked Anderson to handle “Richard Ryan” (another FBI agent) case; again Anderson agreed to do so. Both Anderson and Marine then were brought to
court for multiple counts including bribery, hobbs act, RICO. Marine,
individually, was also charged for tax evasion.178These charges also included ten other incidents of bribery beside Mingo and Ryan trapping.179
To the point of joinder counts, Marine urged the government made
an error in joining his other counts with tax evasion that based on another case, Mulvihill.180 The court referred to “Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 8, joinder of counts is permitted when ‘the offenses charged
... are based on the same act or transaction ...’ while in this case, bribery
on Mulvihill became the predicate crime of RICO, and a foundation of
hobbs act count and was one of unreported income for his tax evasion
count.”181 The court distinguished this case with United States v. Kenny
and United States v. Kopituk, showing that in Kenny, the court ruled
joinder of tax evasion count is appropriate when it is based upon direct
income from activities charged by other counts because in both of these
cases, there was only one unreported income.182 In fact, in Anderson, although the bribe was only one of three sources it could not get rid of the
Id. 1283
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178
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180
Ibid. at 1288.
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fact the tax evasion was some of based on this income;183 however, the
jury convicted a lessen offense for him which only filing a false return
that lead Marine to urge before this court that this joinder could not be
exist.184 The court emphasized the evidence shown by the government
was clear and joined counts could stand.185
C. The Use of Indirect Method of Proof in Investigating Illicit Enrichment
The tax evasion sub-chapter mentioned the government has the burden of proof to convict a defendant; in fact, often direct evidence could
not be found because it has been destroyed or covered by the defendant.
Responding this problem, the U.S. has established indirect methods of
proof which allow special agents to “gather and present evidence to support the allegation”;As IRS mentions in its guidelines, “tax crimes are
often acts of individual greed and, therefore, very little “direct evidence”
is usually available and depending on the facts and circumstances of each
investigation, the subject’s correct taxable income may be established by
“direct” or several “indirect” methods of proof, usually using circumstantial or “indirect” evidence.”186 This indirect evidence will be used to
decide what “income should have been reported on the subject’s return
and compare the result to the amount shown on the filed return”187
Nonetheless, “sources of income may not be identifiable, as in a
specific item method of proof, thus taxable income often has to be computed indirectly based upon the tax payer’s application of use of funds.”
188
In using indirect methods of proof, the agents must “establish a prima
facie understatement of income” which obligates the defendant to defend his or her claim. A court may find fraud sustained if the defendant
has offered no adequate explanation of the difference between “(on the
one hand) expenditures, bank deposits, and increases in net worth and
Anderson, supra note 181, 1288
Ibid
185
Ibid
186
Internal Revenue Manual 9.5.9 Methods of Proof, 9.5.9.2.2 Indirect Methods
[IRS Manual 5], updated March 19, 2012 available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/
irm_09-005-009.html.
187
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(on the other hand) the amount of reported income.” 189
The IRS guidance mentions there are two approaches when it comes
to use indirect methods of proof. If a tax payer has maintained his or
her books and records, then the agents may use basic approach in which
they may have to trace the books and specify the unreported income
items; however, if they found it is difficult to specify unreported income
because there are no accurate books or records, the agents may have to
apply aggregate approach. This approach requires the agents to conduct specific item investigation of all income and compare the resulted
income to the subject taxable income.190Further, the specific investigation may be applied by looking through third party books and records,
but 191the agents are not obligated to identify the individual items that
increased the tax payer’s income. 192
1. The Net-Worth Method
The oldest indirect method of proof is the net worth method. The
IRS has used this method for over fifty years to “satisfy one of the
elements of proof is necessary to obtain a conviction for income tax
evasion.”193 Special agents use the net worth method when they suspect a taxpayer is hiding increases in wealth, especially increases coming from non-taxable sources like gifts.194Conducting an investigation
of this increasing of wealth is challenging because the suspect would
likely “do not have sufficient books and records, or books and records
are not available, or the taxpayer withhold the books and records.”195
The net worth method solves this problem by “providing probative circumstantial evidence which may be corroborated with other evidence
of the substantive crime.”196
In using this method, the special agents must establish correct taxable income, which can be broken down into four steps. First, the speIbid
Internal Revenue 5, supra note 194
191
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cial agents have to establish the subject’s net worth at the beginning and
end period. After that they may deduct the beginning period’s net worth
from the ending period; this way, they may see the change of net worth
(assets less liabilities).197 Second, this change is adjusted for personal living expenses, nondeductible losses, and nontaxable items to arrive at a
corrected adjusted gross income figure, so then the agents may find gross
income.198 Third, this gross income is adjusted to itemized deductions to
correct the taxable income figure.199 Finally, the agents may determine
whether the subject failed to report any taxable incomes by comparing
the corrected taxable income with the reported taxable income.200
In general, while courts have held that the net worth method is constitutional to be used in criminal cases, some questions remain: whether
this method requires corroborating evidence derived from direct methods of proof; whether the government submitted sufficient evidence;
whether expert witness testimony is admissible; how to establish the
burden of proof; and whether the government has to negate all income
to establish correct taxable income. The IRS uses Holland v. United
States as guidance to respond those issues.
The Court in Holland affirmed the trial judgment where the defendants, Mr. and Ms. Holland, who had a hotel, a bar, and a restaurant,
were found guilty of failing to report $19,736.74 of income. Before
coming to the decision in Holland, the court answered some issues related to the use of net worth method.
First, to the question of corroboration validity, the Court cited to
Capone v. United States where the Court held that the indictments were
sufficient to uphold the demurrer and withstand the motion in arresting
the defendant for tax evasion.201 In Capone, the defendant brought the
case before the court arguing that the count 13 and 18 (misdemeanor)
are unrelated directly and positively to other tax evasion counts;202 therefore the government cannot use the direct evidence of count 13 and 18
IRS Guidance 1, supra note 9.
Ibid
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200
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in corroboration with tax evasion counts.203The Court reasoned “each of
counts directly and positively affirm and no return whatever was made
to proper collector from the IRS and it is clear that the statute gives the
IRS authority to receive and file the return fully warrants.” 204
Second, the court explained how courts should determine sufficiency of evidence by citing to Guzik v. United States. 205In that case, defendant argued that the government has failed to establish a net taxable
income because it had lacked of accurate sources of the defendant’s
income.206 The court held that the government has performed sufficient
evidence to indict the defendant for tax evasion,207reasoned that the defendant in this case was not charged by “deviation of official form;”208
thus the finding would not be different even if the defendant could give
more accurate information.209
Third, the court in Holland explained how courts must validate expert witness from the government by citing to United States v. Johnson.210
In Johnson, the Court reversed and remanded the judgment because the
court of appeal’s rule was error in determining that the jury could have
been misled by the government’s expert witness.211 The Court in Johnson reasoned as long as a proper guidance has been delivered by a trial
court then the jury has the authority to exercise the quality and weight
of a testimony, and nothing could take it from the jury.212
Next, the Court in Holland examined the facts by considering the
rulings of net worth method above. To the sufficiency of evidence in
Holland, the Court ruled it is true that in tax evasion prosecution a defendant has right to defend his or her; showing that in Holland, the
defendants had appropriate accounting system, including books and
records but the government had the authority to prove beyond their
Ibid
Ibid
205
Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121(1954)
206
Guzik v. United States, 54 F.2d 618, 620 (7th Cir. 1931)
207
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self-serving declarations using “all legal evidence to determine whether
there is accurate.213
Moreover, the Court ruled that the government has performed sufficient evidence to establish the defendants’ opening net worth,214 in
which the government looked through their income sources and their
expenses.215 To the issue of validity of government expert witness and
jury instruction, the Court emphasized the instruction was not misleading because it reflected “the concept of beyond reasonable doubt
to the jury.”216 All of reasons above brought the Court to hold that the
judgment must stand, although the government might not negate all of
non-taxable income, all of the government’s evidence is convincing.
Looking to discussion above, Holland has been noted as a very helpful
case for lower courts in determining the constitutionality of net worth
method application in tax evasion case.217
2. The Bank Deposit Method
Besides the net worth method, the U.S. special agents also use the
bank deposit method to establish “understatement of taxable income”
by “analyzing all of deposits and canceled checks which relate to any
and all bank accounts controlled by the subject and documenting the
subject’s currency expenditures and cash on hand.”218 Additionally,
the bank deposit method is used when there is lacking of information
from books and records.219 The IRS guidance for this method cites to
Gleckman v. United States, 80 F. 2d 394 (8th Cir. 1935) to explain the
Holland, supra note 213, 131-32.
The defendants argued the government failed to establish accurate opening net
worth because the government only counted the stock costing $29,650 and $2,153.09
and left aside the defendants’s cash on hand that they had kept in a canvas bag, a suitcase, and a metal box. Id. at 133.
215
The government had presented to the jury that the defendants had spent small bills
at that time. Although, the defendants claimed they had cash on hand and the husband
had sold for about $50,000 in stock, the government found there was no receipt or
dividends reported—showing that they had sold all stock that they have ever had. Id.
at 134.
216
Ibid. at 139
217
See United States v. Hall, 650 F.2d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Mastropieri, 685 F.2d 776, 793 (2d Cir. 1982).
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government’s obligation to establish evidentiary facts when it uses this
method:
“The subject was engaged in an income-producing business, activity, or
profession; the subject made periodic deposits of funds into his or her
bank accounts, or into nominee bank accounts over which he or she exercised control, the deposits into the above referenced accounts reflect
current year income and adequate investigation of deposits was made by
the investigating special agent to negate the possibility that deposits arose
from nontaxable sources, unidentified deposits have an inherent appearance of income.”220

Like the net worth method, the bank deposit method also requires
the government to establish taxable income. The IRS guidelines emphasize ownership of accounts or receiving money from other accounts
is insufficient to establish taxable income.221 The government, at least,
has to collect several evidentiary facts: “the subject has a business or
other regular income source; the subject made regular deposits into an
account; the subject draws against the account for personal use; there is
testimony that the subject has income; and deposited amounts exceed
exemptions and deductions.”222
Several steps should be taken by the agents to establish taxable income. First, accumulating all incomes including all deposits (bank and
other saving accounts, cash on hand and non-negotiated instruments,
other saving and currency expenditures, and noncash income.223 Second, to get the gross income, the investigators should deduct the accumulating income with non income deposits and items (including loan,
inheritance, decreasing cash on hand), and cash good sold.224 Third, this
gross income should be deducted with total business expenses, and adjustment to income (including IRS deduction), then the investigators
will get the corrected adjusted gross income.225 Fourth, to derive the corIbid. 9.5.9.7.1.1 Legal Requirements to Establish a Prima Facie Bank Deposits
Investigation.
221
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222
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rected taxable income, this adjusted gross income should be deducted
by itemized deductions/standard deduction (as corrected) and personal
exemptions (as corrected).226 Finally, to get the additional taxable income for criminal purposes, the special investigators have to deduct
the corrected taxable income with reported taxable income from the
subject.227
3. The Expenditure Method
The expenditure method is an indirect method of proof used when
the agents indicate a taxpayer report “does not substantially increase
during the period under investigation,” or if the agents notice “extravagant living expenditures.”228 These expenditures may be shown by tangible and intangible properties including food, gifts, and vacation, to
third parties or stocks, bonds.229 The expenditure method is so similar
with the net worth method; thus if the special agents use the expenditure
method, they must also use the net worth method.230 When it comes to
convincing the jury, the attorney will choose whichever is more persuasive in a given case.231
This method is conducted by establishing expenditures of the subject (money spent or applied).232 Next, to get the corrected adjusted gross
income, the agents should deduct the calculation of expenditures with
non-taxable sources of funds.233 The corrected adjusted gross income
must be deducted by personal exemption;234 so the agents will get the
corrected taxable income.235 Like other indirect methods of proof, the
expenditure method is completed when the unreported income is found
by deducting corrected taxable income with reported taxable income.236
Ibid
Ibid
228
IRS Manual 3, supra note 11, 9.5.9.6.2 When and How the Expenditures Method
is Used, updated Nov. 5, 2004, available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005009.html#d0e1812.
229
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230
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Ibid. 9.5.9.6.3 The Expenditures Method of Proof Formula
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4. The Cash Method
Another useful type of indirect method of proof is the cash method.237 This method is dedicated to seek unreported cash income which
is usually related to the investigation for underlying crimes “involving
bribery, drug dealing, and cash skimming from businesses, and similar situations where unreported income is in the form of cash.”238 The
agents use the cash method when it comes to a subject who “has limited
sources of income and deposits in bank accounts where non-cash uses
can be traced.”239 The cash sources include cash returned on deposits,
checks written to cash, cash withdrawn from financial accounts, cash
contents of a safe deposit box, and cash on hand.”240 The formula of this
method is started by calculating all of the cash uses.241 Next, the result
calculation is deducted with known cash sources that will result in an
additional taxable income (unreported income). 242
Like other indirect methods of proof, the cash method is only governed by IRS guidance; however it has been supported by many courts’s
ruling. For instance, in United States v. Hogan where the defendant,
Martin F. Hogan, once argued that the trial court was relied on inadmissible evidence and invalids the use of cash method.243 The court held
that the district court was not err on “the issues of severance and the
admissibility of the cash method evidence.”244 First, the Court argued
that the district court instruction to the jury was not err because it was
the jury’s duty to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, including the
tax experts. 245
Next, to Hogan’s argument that the cash method is “an untested
and “unapproved circumstantial method of proof,”246 the court ruled
IRS Manual 4, supra note 12, 9.5.9.8 Cash Method of Proving Income, updated
Nov. 5, 2004, available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-009-cont01.html.
238
Ibid
239
Ibid
240
Ibid
241
Ibid
242
Ibid
243
United States v. Hogan, 886 F.2d 1497, 1508 (7th Cir. 1989).
244
Ibid. p. 1513.
245
Ibid. p. 1508
246
Ibid
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that “under appropriate circumstances the cash method is an admissible
method of proof if the government satisfies evaluation criteria similar
to the traditional cash expenditures method.”247 Specifically, in reasoning, the court emphasized the facts that Hogan used to save his income
in a bank account and spent his money through a banking institution,
and did have limited sources of income, made the use of cash method is
appropriate.248
Moreover, the defendant urged that the government failed to “identify cash on hand.”249 The court mentioned in using the cash method,
there should be an assessment of cash on hand at the beginning of the
first year; in this case, the court found that the government has established sufficient investigation to establish cash on hand. Indeed, at the
beginning of 1981, Hogan did not have cash on hand, no gifts, inheritances, and other nontaxable income in 1980.250 Although “he had fancy
boat and car, he was spending his money to pay interest and several
loans and account at that time.”251These findings are supported by “the
defendant’s testimony in the cross examination that he often received
late payment notices from credit card companies and that one credit card company had placed his account in the hands of its collection
department.”252As a result, “the jury could have found with reasonable
certainty that Hogan did not have any cash on hand at the beginning of
1981.” 253
In summary, the court in Hogan provided better explanation what
the government needs to establish in using the case method and what is
the relation of cash method and expenditure method. Indeed, in this case,
the use of cash method is appropriate because the defendant had a very
limited sources of income.254 Additionally, like other indirect methods
of proof, although in this case the government expert testified, the jury
Ibid. p. 1509
Ibid
249
Ibid
250
Ibid. at 1510
251
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252
Ibid
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Ibid
254
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had the authority to decide the witness’s credibility.255 To the government performance in establishing cash on hand, the government in Hogan has performed sufficient evidence because it traced the defendant’s
income and transaction.256 Finally, this section draws the U.S. approach
in dealing with the illicit enrichment of public official; instead of criminalizing the illicit enrichment, the U.S. has developed financial disclosure system that provides civil and criminal prosecution and tax evasion
prosecution that during the investigation, the special agents may use
indirect methods of proof. This investigation may lead to underlying
crimes, prosecutors may use joinder counts in further prosecution.
V. WHY INDONESIA HAS TO CONSIDER TO REFORM ITS
SYSTEM IN DEALING WITH ILLICIT ENRICHMENT
It appears that Indonesia has a promising system for supporting corruption eradication. However, so far, this system has not yet worked because there is no enforcement mechanism if a public official fails to file
or gives false information, and there is no specific indirect methods of
proof to investigate the financial disclosure statement that may strength
evidence to convict corruption. As a result, there is no significant number of public officials who file their financial disclosure statements. By
the same token, for registered financial disclosure statements, the KPK
cannot use indirect proof to convict defendants of corruption. The Prosecutor has the same problem in prosecuting tax evasion and joined it
with other crimes.
Like Indonesia, the U.S. prefers not to criminalize illicit enrichment, staying focused on civil and criminal prosecution for financial
disclosure statement, and tax evasion. Different with Indonesia, however, U.S., financial disclosure statements are filled to institution where
a public official works, but the U.S. Department of Justice (hereinafter
DOJ) may bring civil and criminal charge for violation for failed to
file and to give false information. For tax evasion, the IRS investigates
suspicious tax reports where tax-payers hid their wealth to avoid tax.
That wealth would possibly come from illegal income. Investigating
255
256
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this tax reports, agents may find lack of direct evidence; thus they may
use the indirect methods of proof, such as the net worth, bank deposit,
expenditure, and cash methods.
This paper finds that while the U.S. approach sounds promising,
there has been no discussion about this approach in Indonesia. Indeed,
several Indonesian researchers have been conducting research projects
focused on looking to countries which prefer or tend to criminalize illicit enrichment, such as Australia, and China. To that point, this section
is dedicated to analyze why Indonesia should consider to looking at the
U.S. approach to figure out what and how Indonesia may improve its
own approach to illicit enrichment cases. First sub-section will show rationales to look at the U.S. approach. Next sub-section will present what
improvement may be proposed and what possible barrier may be faced.
A. Rationales and Recommendations to Reform Indonesian Illicit Enrichment Investigation
Indonesia has been driven to combat corruption by the facts of rampant and pervasive corruption not only steals state fund, violates citizen
social and economic rights. Although, under international law jurisdiction, corruption has not yet been classified as an extraordinary crime,
but to emphasize Indonesian government commitment to combat corruption, the Corruption Act in its preamble states that corruption as an
extraordinary crime that should be treated in extraordinary way.257 The
extraordinary way includes prosecution and prevention that shall be in
line with public aspiration.258
Scholars and civil society, of course, support the government commitment; but then the use term extraordinary creates heated debates.
The government creates severe punishment in order to deter not only
defendants, but also to prevent other people to commit the same offenses. It turns out by providing both criminal and economy sanctions
under the Combating Corruption Act. Even this Act allows prosecutors
to charge a defendant with capital punishment if he or she commits corruption in critical or emergency situation, such as natural disaster state
fund or economic crisis; or continuing corruption.
257
258

Combating Corruption Act, supra note 3, Penjelasan Umum [General Explanation].
Ibid
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In fact, severe punishments are not a panacea to combat corruption—to decrease people commits this offense—a number of research
show that enhancing certainty in prosecution is more effective to deter
rather than creates more severe punishment.259 Besides in imposing severe punishments, the government has to deal with human rights issue
where Indonesian Constitution protect the right to live,260 but it also allows the government to create laws to impose severe punishment when
it comes to crimes that cause massive and serious damage to society.261
It turns out, reality is far from what the Clean-State Act and the
Combating Corruption Act want to achieve. Fifteen years after the establishment of those Acts, corruption is still pervasive.262 Severe punishments governed by the Corruption Act do not influence people to
avoid to do corruption.263 It is not because those punishments are not
severe enough; scholars have found the problem is the uncertainty of
Indonesian criminal justice system.264 Indeed, during July 2012-june
2013, the Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) found there were 753
corruption cases.265 Most of them got low sentences: probation for 4
defendants, one year imprisonment for 185 defendants, one-two years
imprisonment for 167 defendants, two-five years imprisonment for 217
defendants, five-ten years for 35 defendants, and above ten years for
It can be seen by looking to several studies conducted by the Institute of Criminology at Cambridge University, DANIEL NAGIN AND GREG POGARSKY, VALERIE
WRIGHT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL Justice Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity
of Punishment, The Sentencing Project 4, ( 2010) , available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/deterrence%20briefing%20.pdf.
260
Indonesian Constitution art. 28 A.
261
Id. art. 28 J (2).
262
See generally, Toto Suryaningtyas, Reformasi Hukum Sebatas Jargon Semu, UNISOSDEM, http://www.unisosdem.org/article_detail.php?aid=6251&coid=3&caid=2
1&gid=3 (last visited May 22, 2014).
263
See generally, Yuni Arisandy, ICW: Pengambilan Aset Sanksi Efektif Bagi Koruptor
[ICW: Asset Recovery Would Deter Corruptors], ANTARA NEWS (Nov. 13, 2013),
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/404856/icwpengambilan-aset-sanksi-efektifbagi-koruptor.
264
Tebang Pilih Sangat Kentara: Pemberantasan Korupsi di Daerah Mandek [Selective Prosecution Revealed: Law Enforcement Has Been Stuck], ANTI KORUPSIICW (March 7, 2006), http://www.antikorupsi.org/id/content/tebang- pilih-sangatkentara-pemberantasan-korupsi-di-daerah-mandek.
265
Indonesia Corruption Watch et. al., supra note 60, at 26
259
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five defendants, besides five defendants got releases.266 If we look case
by case, we could see the disproportionality of punishments.267 As the
Indonesian chapter of this paper mentioned the Combating Corruption
Act has many provisions that give the opportunity to prosecutors and
judges to exercise their powers.268 Senior level of public officials who
committed corruption mostly got lower punishments, but it does not
work for lower level of public officials who committed the same offenses.269 The disproportionality then causes lack of trust to the legal
apparatus especially to the Attorney and the Supreme Court. This paper
recommends that instead of figuring out how to criminalize and set up
severe punishment for illicit enrichment, Indonesian government has
to consider staying focus not to criminalize, but improve its financial
disclosure system and tax evasion prosecution. The Indonesian government may look to the U.S. approach, and choose which part may be
useful and applicable.
First, there are some similarity and differences of Indonesia and the
U.S. financial disclosure system. Both countries obligate senior public
officials from three branches of government: executive, legislative, and
judicial to file financial disclosure statement before, during, and after
office period that includes report of assets, income, and liabilities. In
general, the purpose of financial disclosure system is to prevent conflict
of interest and illicit enrichment.270 For illicit enrichment, scholars found
that “enhancing the effectiveness of [financial disclosure] system as a
tool for the prosecution of corruption, or for the prosecution of corruption, or for the detection and return of stolen assets is a corollary of the
[purpose] of financial disclosure system.”271
Ibid
Antikorupsi-ICW, supra note 272
268
See Combating Corruption Act, supra note 3, art. 2, 3, 5, and 12.
269
See generally, Ujang Idrus, Legislator: Pemberantasan Korupsi Jangan Tebang
Pilih [Lawmakers: Combating Corruption Should Be Impartial], ANTARANEWS
(March 12, 2014), http://www.antaranews.com/berita/423682/legislator-pemberantasan-korupsi-jangan-tebang-pilih. =
270
Ruxandra Burdescu, et al, Income and Asset Declarations: Tools And Trade-Offs
at 4, the World Bank, Stolen Asset Recovery (STAR) Initiative, and UNODC (2009),
available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/StAR/StAR_
Publication_-_Income_and_Asset_Declarations.pdf.
271
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The finding reflects what has happened in Indonesia. Historically,
illicit enrichment of public official happened massively under Soeharto
era (dictatorship regime).272 Soeharto, his family, along with his colleagues were extremely enriched during his presidency. 273At that time
there were no sufficient laws and independent legal apparatus taken
place to prosecute them.274 Learning from that experience, Indonesia
established financial disclosure system under the Clean-State Act and
the KPK under the Combating Corruption Act and the KPK Act. Meanwhile, in the U.S., financial disclosure was bought to people’s attention
as a response to the Watergate scandal.275 In brief, the scandal was about
illegally breaking to the Democratic National Committee offices by
Nixon’s administration.276 This incident was believed related to Nixon’s
re-election campaign in which Nixon tried to cover up by raising hush
money to pay the burglars, and destroying evidences.277 Since then the
U.S. established two laws to dealing with transparency and ethics: the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and from the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.278
Although both countries have the similar experience, Indonesia and
the U.S. included financial disclosure under different systems. Indonesia inserted financial disclosure into corruption eradication regime under the Clean-State Act—and it became stronger with the establishment
According TI, Soeharto was the most corrupt president in the globe. He got more
than $15-35 million from his 32 years presidency. TI: Mantan Presiden Soeharto Pemimpin Paling Korup di Dunia [TI: Soeharto, Former President of Indonesia Was the
Most Corrupt Leader], HUKUM ONLINE (March 26, 2004), http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol9987/ti-mantan-presiden-soeharto-pemimpin-paling-korupdi-dunia-.
273
Ibid
274
Gusti Grehenson, Setelah Ada KPK, Kinerja Kepolisian and Kejaksaan Naik [After
the Establishment of KPK, the Kepolisian and the Kejaksaan Have Been Improved],
UGM (Nov. 15, 2013), http://ugm.ac.id/id/berita/8410- setelah.ada.kpk.kinerja.kepolisian.dan.kejaksaan.naik.
275
Burdescu, et al, supra note 281, p. 28
276
Watergate, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/watergate (last visited April
12, 2014).
277
Mark Stencel, The Reform, WASHINGTON POST (June 13, 1997), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp- srv/national/longterm/watergate/legacy.htm; See generally,
John Blake, Forgetting A Key Lesson From Watergate? CNN.COM (Feb. 4, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/04/politics/watergate-reform/.
278
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of the Combating Corruption Act and the KPK Act that mentions the
result of financial disclosure investigation may be used to strengthen the
evidence in corruption prosecution—essentially financial disclosure is
seen as morality obligation because there is no civil and criminal prosecution. Interestingly, the US established financial disclosure system
under the ethic Act, but it provides civil and criminal prosecution for
public officials who fail or give false with imprisonment and fine sanction. Meanwhile, the Indonesian laws provide administrative sanction
that is not specifically explained.
According to the UNODC, preferences to provide civil and criminal prosecution depend on the goals of financial disclosure system. If
the system is created to investigate illicit enrichment, then governments
may focus on monitoring public official’s wealth with the goal to detect
the “concealment or theft of assets” and provide “administrative and
criminal sanctions, including heavy fines.”279 In contrast, if the goal is
to prevent conflict of interest that will lead to ethics misbehavior, then
the sanction is unnecessary.280 When look at the Indonesian government
intention on inserting financial disclosure into the Clean-State Act, and
supported by the Combating Corruption Act, it must be clear that the
financial disclosure system is meant to be an active tool to detect corrupt offenses; therefore providing civil and criminal prosecution with
administrative, imprisonment, and fine sanctions will be necessary.
Furthermore, there should be a method to investigate illicit enrichment showed by financial disclosure statement that may lead to corrupt offenses. The Indonesian government should consider developing
indirect methods of proof like what the U.S. has in its tax prosecution.
These indirect methods of proof may be varied such as net worth method, bank deposit, cash and expenditure methods. Looking to resources
that Indonesia already has, those indirect methods of proof may be incorporated to financial disclosure system under the KPK and tax evasion prosecution under the Civil Tax Investigator.
Practically, this paper suggests when it comes to a suspicious financial disclosure statement, the KPK may ask the Civil Tax Investigator
for more information about the suspect’s tax return along with their
279
280

Burdescu, et al, supra note 281, at 7.
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families and colleagues that may be related with his alleged corrupt
offenses. Those institutions may work together to investigate the illicit
enrichment, and the KPK may prosecute for civil or criminal prosecution of financial disclosure violation along with joinder corrupt offenses. The same collaboration may be established, when the Civil Tax
Investigator finds a suspicious tax return that may be related to corruption. This institution may ask the KPK about the financial disclosure information. Further, if there is substantial evidence to continue to joinder
prosecution of tax evasion and corruption, the KPK may supervise the
Kejaksaan in this regard. Of course, those institutions also need to collaborate with the PPATK when it comes to investigate bank and other
accounts.
To implement those ideas, there must be amendment of the KPK Act
and the Combating Corruption Act by adding a special chapter about
illicit enrichment which includes law enforcement mechanism for failure to file or to give false information of financial disclosure, joining
charges of financial disclosure and tax evasion with corruption. In addition, the Acts should incorporate with memorandum of understanding on investigating illicit enrichment between the KPK, the Civil Tax
Investigator, the Attorney, and the PPATK. This graphic below shows
the new approach of investigating illicit enrichment.
This paper finds several advantages that Indonesia would get if the
government implements the ideas. First, the government does not have
to face constitutional issues as consequences of criminalizing illicit enrichment because this paper suggests another way to address illicit enrichment. Second, by applying the indirect methods of proof, Indonesia
would not only improve its law enforcement to combat corruption, but
also to increase the conviction rate of tax evasion. Third, as the legal apparatus would perform better, Indonesia would get more asset recovery
both from corruption and tax evasion convictions.
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Feature 1: Proposed Law Enforcement Mechanism
Prosecution of Financial Disclosure Violation

Suspicious
financial disclosure
statement--in
relation with
corruption

Financial
disclosure
statement
prosecution +
Indirect methods
of proof by the
KPK

Joined charges of
tax evasion with
corruption by the
KPK

Prosecution of Tax Evasion

Tax evasion

Suspicious tax
return--in
relation with
corruption

prosecution +
Indirect methods
of proof by the
Civil Tax
Investigator may
be supervised by
the KPK

Joined charges
of tax evasion
with corruption
by the
Kejaksaan--may
be supervised
by the KPK
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B. Possible Challenges and Overcome Strategies in
Reforming Indonesian Illicit Enrichment Investigation
As the UNODC mentions in its report, investigating illicit enrichment and preventing conflict of interest “require management and accountability arrangements in terms of human resources, budget, technology, and facilities.” These requirements would also be possible
challenges if the Indonesian government establishes civil and criminal prosecution for financial disclosure system, incorporates the indirect methods of proof and joinder violation of corruption and tax evasion prosecution.
First, the lacking of government political will would likely be a
challenge to reform the approach to illicit enrichment; however, the
reform of laws may still have chances in the future because the Corruption Act and the KPK Act has been put on bill lists of Indonesian
Parliament (DPR) since 2010.281 In addition, Indonesia is now holding
Election for new government. Clearly, all of candidates promise there
would be improvement law enforcement for corruption.282 Despite the
decreasing of public distrust to election, this momentum may be used
to push the new government to prove their promises. As usual, the new
government will be very concern with their public image at the beginning of their leadership.283
Second, the quantity and quality of human resources specifically in
Prolegnas 2010-2014, DIREKTORAT JENDRAL PERATURAN PERUNDANGUNDANGAN, KEMENTERIAN HUKUM DAN HAK ASASI MANUSIA, http://
ditjenpp.kemenkumham.go.id/prolegnas-2010-2014.html (last visited April 16, 2014).
282
Fiddy Anggriawan, Janji Pemberantasan Korupsi Masih Mendominasi [Promises
to Enhance Law Enforcement to Combat Corruption Have Dominated], OKEZONE.
COM,http://pemilu.okezone.com/read/2014/03/20/567/958319/janji-pemberantasankorupsi-masih-mendominasi.
283
For instance, President Yudhono (2004-2009, and 2009-present) has used improving law enforcement performance to combat corruption as main campaign and it has
been proven he tried to keep good image in the first 100 days of his leadership by
enacting President Memorandum about Combating Corruption. See generally, Ihsan
Dalimunte, Skandal Century Awal Tumpulnya Taji SBY Berantas Korupsi [Century
Case, Beginning of SBY Failure to Combat Corruption], RMOL.CO (Oct. 2, 2011)
http://www.rmol.co/read/2011/10/02/41178/Skandal-Century- Awal-Tumpulnya-Taji-SBY-Berantas-Korupsi-.
281
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the KPK and the Civil Tax Investigator, as a new independent institution the KPK has an outstanding performance showing within five years
this institution was able to reach 100% conviction rate.284 To some cases,
the KPK took quite long time.�According to the ICW, the KPK would
have done better if this Institution is supported by sufficient number of
investigators.� The commissioner of Hong Kong Corruption Eradication Commission (ICAC) shares his concern that the 750 personals of
KPK have to look out for five million civil servants, 500,000 police officers, with 200 million citizens.� As a result, the KPK has a number of
workloads as shown by this table.�
Feature 2: the workloads of KPK

Year

Prelimenary
Investigations Prosecutions
Probes

Verdicts

2009

67

49

61

34

2010

54

62

55

38

2011

78

66

45

34

However, this condition would not be a problem because the KPK is
not meant to be the one and only institution to combat corruption. This
institution has been working together with the Attorney, the PPATK, the
Police, and other special intelligences. This collaboration should also
be implemented in investigating illicit enrichment. For instance, the Attorney has more 8500 prosecutors all over Indonesia;285 The Police has
ANTI-CORRUPTION RESOURCE CENTER (U4), AN EXCEPTION TO THE
RULE? WHY INDONESIA’S ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION SUCCEEDS
WHERE OTHERS DON’T- A COMPARISON WITH THE PHILLIPPINES’ OMBUDSMAN (2010), http://www.u4.no/publications/an-exception-to-the-rule-why-indonesia-s-anti-corruption-commission-succeeds-where-others-don-t-a-comparison-with-the
philippines-ombudsman/#sthash.7cUnnMkt.dpuf.
285
Djibril Muhammad, Punya 8500 Penyidik, Kejagung Tunggu Permintaan KPK
[The Kejagung Waits for KPK to Coordinate its 8500 Prosecutors], ROL REPUBLIKA
ONLINE (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/12/10/02/
mb9ql3-punya-8500-penyidik-kejagung-tunggu- permintaan-kpk.
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special subdivision of corruption which consists of 600 investigators286
and there are more 32000 tax officers.287 These numbers of apparatus
along with sufficient technology would likely give more opportunity
to investigate illicit enrichment. Additionally, there are many ways to
enhance the skills of investigators. For one, holding more seminars and
workshops would be necessary.
Second, investigating illicit enrichment would likely spend more
money to set up the technology and enhancing the skills of investigators; however this challenge may be overcome by collaborating financial opportunity of the institutions (the KPK, the PPATK, the Attorney,
the Police, the Tax Investigator). Notably, some of those institutions
have started to work with legal apparatus all over the globe sharing
legal information especially when it comes to money laundering and asset recovery. As a follow up, Indonesian investigators may invite these
foreign investigators to share their experience. Unconventional training, such as teleconference, may also be used that would likely cut the
expenses.
Third, inflexibility of court jurisdiction in Indonesia would be a
challenge in integrating financial disclosure and tax evasion prosecution with corruption. This paper has been discussing that the KPK has
authority for registering and investigating financial disclosure. The
finding in financial disclosure investigation may be used by the KPK to
strengthen the evidence in prosecuting corruption in which the special
court of corruption has jurisdiction of it. Meanwhile, tax evasion prosecution is under the tax regime where Civil Tax Investigator is leading
investigation and passes the case to Attorney for prosecution under the
Special Court of Tax jurisdiction. For the idea of establishing financial
disclosure criminal and civil prosecution, this paper urges the governDani Prabowo, Polri Akui Kekurangan Penyidik Kasus Korupsi [Indonesian National Police Admits Having Lack of Investigators], Kompas.com (Nov. 12, 2013),
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/11/12/1406543/Polri.Akui.Kekurangan.Penyidik.Kasus.Korupsi.
287
Dina Mirayanti Hatauhuruk, Dirjen Pajak: Banyak Pegawai Pajak ‘Bandel’! [The
Head of Direktorat Pajak: There Are Many Negligence Officers],OKEZONE.COM
(May 20, 2013), http://economy.okezone.com/read/2013/05/20/20/809474/dirjenpajak-banyak-pegawai-pajak-bandel.
286

115

Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015

Criminal Liability of Public Officials for Illicit Enrichment: Comparing Approaches...

ment should add joined of tax evasion with corruption charge under
the Special Court of Corruption jurisdiction, historically and practically
speaking, this court has been handling corroboration of money laundering and corruption. Under Indonesian Money Laundering Act stipulates
that money laundering should be held by a court which has jurisdiction
of the predicate or underlying crime.288 Furthermore, the idea to corroborate evidence on tax evasion and corruption and join those charges
would likely to be resolved under flexibility of special court of corruption jurisdiction. This paper suggests that if a tax evasion charge related
to corruption it should be held in the special court of corruption. This
argument is supported, again, by the experience in prosecuting money
laundering. 289
VI. Conclusion
Although there has been robust improvement in Indonesian legal
frameworks, corruption remains as a big problem, imposing economic,
social, and political costs in Indonesia. One issue contributing to this
lack of stability is illicit enrichment of public officials. Instead of complying with Article 20 UNCAC which recommends criminalizing illicit
enrichment of public officials, in Indonesia illicit enrichment of public
official is monitored by the KPK through financial disclosure of public
officials and may be used to strengthen the evidence in corruption prosecution. However, to date, there is no law to allow the civil and criminal
prosecution for failing to file or to give false statement, nor does the law
describe the specific methods of proof which may be used by the KPK
to investigate the illicit enrichment. As a result, this system does not
work. Only few public officials file their financial disclosure statements;
meanwhile there are no further steps to investigate the registered financial disclosure statements. This paper urges the Indonesian government
to consider adapting the U.S. approach, where illicit enrichment has
been addressed by criminal and civil prosecution of financial disclosure
along with tax evasion prosecution that may be joined with corruption
charge. The U.S. tax investigators use indirect methods of proof, such
Undang-Undang tentang Pencucian Uang [Money Laundering Act], Act No. 8,
2010, art. 74 and 75
289
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as the net worth, bank deposit, and cash expenditure, to proof indirectly
tax evasion and other underlying crimes. This approach would be beneficial to Indonesia for strengthening both corruption and tax evasion
prosecutions because the Indonesian legal apparatus will enable to use
both financial disclosure statement and tax return in finding evidence of
illicit enrichment that may be use in corruption prosecutions.
Finally, this paper recommends that the Indonesian government
amend the KPK Act and the Combating Corruption Act by adding a
special chapter about illicit enrichment. This chapter should include law
enforcement mechanisms for failure to file, for giving false information
on financial disclosures, and for joining charges of financial disclosure
and tax evasion with corruption. In addition, the Acts should be supported by a memorandum of understanding on investigating illicit enrichment between the KPK, the PPATK, the Civil Tax Investigator, the
Attorney and the Police. Some possible challenges to this recommendation are the quality and quantity of investigators, financial barriers,
and court jurisdiction. These challenges, however, may be overcome by
integrating the resources from each of these law enforcement institutions, enhancing network with foreign legal apparatus, and integrating
financial disclosure prosecution and tax evasion under special court of
corruption when corruption is an underlying offense.
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